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DORENE A. BOLZE*

Outer Continental Shelf Oil
and Gas Development
in the Alaskan Arctic**
ABSTRACT
The rapid development of the potential hydrocarbon resources of
the outer continental shelf (OCS), especially in Alaska, has been a
primaryfocus of the UnitedStates' nationalenergy policy.This article
examines the statutoryframework and managementprogramfor OCS
oil and gas resources and assesses the ecological implicationsfor
the Alaskan Arctic. CurrentOCS development policy, which the executive branch and the courts have profoundly shaped, does not
conform to the intents of the statutes. Recommendations are offered
that will promote the environmentally sound management of OCS
oil and gas resources necessary to preserve the biological integrity
of the Alaskan Arctic.
INTRODUCTION

The rapid development of the oil and gas resources of the outer continental shelf (OCS)' has been a major component of the United States'
national energy policy under the Reagan and Bush administrations. 2 The
primary focus of this policy is to increase domestic production of petroleum in order to reduce the nation's dependence on foreign supplies of
oil.' The undiscovered economically recoverable resources of the OCS
are estimated to be nearly 12.2 billion barrels of oil (BBO) and 90.5
trillion cubic feet of natural gas. 4 Experts project that the Alaskan OCS
*Environmental policy analyst, Science Division, National Audubon Society, New York, NY.
**This article is based on the master's thesis, D. Bolze, Outer Continental Shelf Oil and Gas
Development in the Alaskan Beaufort Sea (Yale University, spring 1985). The author would like to
thank her thesis advisor, Stephen Kellert, professor of Social Ecology at the Yale School of Forestry
and Environmental Studies, for his guidance, funding, constructive criticisms, and support throughout
this one year research project.
1. The OCS is defined as the submerged lands that lie three miles beyond the coast. The coastal
states own the submerged land within three miles of the coast and the federal government owns the
OCS. Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act Amendments, 43 U.S.C. § 1331(a) (1982).
2. See infra text accompanying notes 216-23.
3. But see infra text accompanying notes 335-38.
4. L. Cooke, Estimates of Undiscovered, Economically Recoverable Oil and Gas Resources for
the Outer Continental Shelf as of July 1984, 21 (1985) (OCS Report NMS 85-0012). These latest
resource estimates are nearly half the estimates made by the Minerals Management Service in 1981,
with a 55% reduction in the amount of oil and a 44% reduction in the amount of natural gas resources.
Id. However, much of the reductions occurred in the estimates for Alaska. The risked mean estimates-which incorporate the probability that an area is nonproductive-for undiscovered econom-
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contains nearly half of the total oil and 40 percent of the natural gas
resources, most of which occur in the Arctic and in two basins in the
Bering Sea.5 Nonetheless, the Arctic OCS hydrocarbon potential comprises only one-fourth of the resources predicted to lie in the Central and
Eastern Gulf of Mexico OCS, and geologists also estimate that amounts
of potential oil resources equal to that in the Arctic exist off Southern
California. 6 Though projections of the undiscovered oil and gas resources
for the Alaskan OCS have dropped nearly 80 percent as a result of
unsuccessful drilling ventures to date,7 the oil industry firmly believes
that economic quantities of oil resources exist in the Alaskan OCS and
is still keenly interested in pursuing exploration.
This article examines the nature of current OCS development policy
and how it has affected and will continue to affect the Alaskan Arctic. 9
ically recoverable oil resources dropped 73% from 1981 values and natural gas estimates went down

78%. These sharp reductions reflect the results of unsuccessful drilling ventures that have occurred
in most of the highly prospective Alaskan offshore areas. Id. at 22. A newly completed report
indicates that the risked mean estimates for the undiscovered economically recoverable resources of
the OCS are 8.2 BBO and 74 trillion cubic feet of natural gas, a reduction from the 1985 estimates
of over 30% and nearly 20%, respectively. U.S. Geo. Survey & Minerals Mgmt. Serv., Dep't of
Interior, Estimates of Undiscovered Conventional Oil and Gas Resources in the United States--A
Part of the Nation's Energy Endowment 19, 26 (1989).
5. Id. at 13, 15-18. The percentages are based on the conditional mean which is the average
amount expected to be found if at least one prospect in each of the Alaskan basins contains economically recoverable quantities of hydrocarbons. Id. at 12. When the risked mean estimates are
used, Alaska only contains 27% of the OCS potential oil resources and 15% of the natural gas
resources. Id. at 13, 15-18.
6. The comparisons in hydrocarbon potential between oil and gas planning areas is based on the
risked mean estimates. Id. The top ten OCS planning areas listed in descending order based on the
risked mean estimates in BBO of undiscovered oil resources are: Central Gulf of Mexico, 3.72;
Western Gulf of Mexico, 1.9; Southern California, 1.54; Navarin Basin (northwest Bering Sea),
0.89; Beaufort Sea 0.89; Chukchi Sea, 0.54; Eastern Gulf of Mexico, 0.41; St. George Basin
(southern Bering Sea), 0.37; Central California, 0.36; and the Mid-Atlantic, 0.35. id.
7, Id. at 15-18.
8. The oil industry since 1984 has consistently ranked four Alaskan OCS areas in the top ten list
for OCS areas of interest. The Beaufort Sea ranks above Southern California and just below the
Gulf of Mexico areas which are consistently at the top. The Navarin Basin, North Aleutian Basin,
and Chukchi Sea are the other Alaskan OCS areas which rank in the top ten, though in the bottom
half. The St. George Basin fell from the top ten with the most recent 1986 ranking. Minerals Mgmt.
Serv., Dep't of Interior, Draft Proposed Final Five-year Outer Continental Shelf Oil and Gas Leasing
Program Mid-1987 to 1992, at Table 13.1-13.3 (Feb. 1986). It is interesting that the North Aleutian
Basin, which encompasses Bristol Bay, ranks so highly although this area in Alaska contains one
of the lowest risked mean resource estimates for oil at 0.08 BBO. L. Cooke, supra note 4, at 16.
The basin's high ranking most likely reflects political influence, since leasing in this area has been
highly controversial. See infra notes 330-33 and accompanying text.
9. The Alaskan Arctic refers to the arctic ecosystem lying within Alaska, bounded physically to
the south by the Brooks range and to the east and west by the USSR and Canada, respectively. The
coastal uplands, coastal plain, barrier islands, coastal waters and offshore territory of the Beaufort
and Chukchi seas are all part of the Alaskan Arctic. J. Jackson, B. Golden, A. Stadnychenko & S.
Kolasknski, Arctic Summary Report Outer Continental Shelf Oil and Gas Activities and Impacts in
the Arctic: A Summary Report I 1-17 (October 1981) (U.S. Geological Survey Open-File Report 81621, 1981); see Figure 1.
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The statutory framework surrounding offshore oil and gas development
is complex and the courts and the executive branch have played an integral
part in formulating the actual process and policy of OCS development.
The reality of the OCS oil and gas development program is presented in
order to assess the environmental implications for the Alaskan Arctic.
The article concludes by offering changes that must be made to move
OCS development back toward the statutory designs as well as changes
to the underlying statutory policies in order to establish environmentally
sound management of this nation's ocean and coastal resources.

THE ALASKAN ARCTIC
The coastal plain and waters of the Alaskan Arctic support a vast array
of wildlife: marine mammals, including the endangered Bowhead whale;
millions of birds for which the Arctic offers vital breeding grounds; four
caribou herds; and a variety of other wildlife and fish populations.' 0 The
Native populations of over 5000 Eskimos, Aleuts, and Athabascans rely
on the abundant wildlife for their subsistence lifestyle." The cultural
structure of the Inupiat Eskimos is based on the annual spring hunt of
the Bowhead whale.' 2 Assessing the effects of extensive offshore oil and
gas development on wildlife and Native subsistence culture in the Alaskan
Arctic is fraught with difficulties. 3 Determining what degree of impact
is acceptable is the fundamental environmental issue surrounding oil and
gas development in the Alaskan Arctic.
The Alaskan Arctic is also a hostile physical environment of severe
cold, permafrost,' 4 severe ocean storms, and sea ice which covers the
Beaufort and Chukchi seas during much of the year. The oil industry will
10. See Bolze & Lee, Offshore Oil and Gas Development: Implications for Alaskan Wildlife, 13
Marine Pol'y 231 passim (1989) [hereinafter Bolze & Lee 1989]; see also U.S. Fish and Wildlife
Serv., Dep't of Interior, I Arctic National Wildlife Refuge, Alaska, Coastal Plain Resource Assessment, Report and Recommendation to the Congress of the United States and Final Legislative
Environmental Impact Statement (April 1987); Cline, A Last Great Stronghold of Wildlife, 13 Ambio
252 (1984).
11. Jones, The Development ofAlaska's Outer Continental Shelf Oil and Gas Resources and the
Federal Trust Responsibility to Native Alaskans. 6 Va. J. Nat. Res. L. 53, 62, 62 n.44 (1986)
[hereinafter Jones 1986].
12. Id. at 62 n.44; Comment, USDI's Outer Continental Shelf Lease Sale in the Beaufort Sea
Contested, 21 Nat. Res. J. 943, 944, 944 n.6 (1981) (authored by Mary Ann Louise Garcia)
[hereinafter Beaufort Sea Contested]. The hunt delineates kin and village relationships and is the
spiritual and emotional basis of the culture. Bocktose, Battle of the Bowheads, 89 Nat. Hist., May
1980.
13. See infra text accompanying notes 55-61.
14. Permafrost, or perennially frozen ground, is ground that remains frozen through at least two
winters and the intervening summer. J. Ives, Permafrost, Arctic and Alpine Environments 159, 160
(i. Ives & R. Barry eds. 1974).
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have to develop different equipment designs for drilling and production
operations, transportation, and pipeline construction to withstand the forces
of the heavy ice floes, permafrost, and subzero temperatures. 5 As a result,

"[olffshore petroleum development in the Arctic will be a major tech-

nological challenge."' 6 Currently, the oil industry's experience in the
severe Arctic offshore environment has been a limited amount of exploratory drilling in the Beaufort Sea and in Canada.' No method has
yet proven effective in cleaning up an oil spill under realistic arctic
conditions which severely hinder conventional methods.'"
Federal activity on the OCS is just one component of the total hydrocarbon development occurring in this region. The oil and gas resources
in the Arctic underlie a region with a complex patchwork of federal, state,
municipal, 9 and native land ownership. 2 The current land ownership
pattern of the Arctic is primarily the product of three statutes. Federal
and state ownership of the Alaskan territory was first delineated under
the Alaska Statehood Act in 1958." The controversy over native land
entitlements, which was delaying the development of Prudhoe Bay, precipitated The Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act (ANCSA) in 1971.22
ANCSA established a unique system of regional and village corporations
through which natives own land and reap economic benefits.23 Federal
claim to millions of acres of National Interest Lands legislated under
15. Office of Technology and Assessment, Oil and Gas Technologies for the Arctic and Deepwater
64 (1985).
16. Id. at 52.
17. Id. at 47. More exploratory experience under the conditions of the Alaskan Arctic has been
gained in the neighboring Canadian offshore waters near the MacKenzie Delta. Id.
18. Id. at 185. Some scientific experts doubt "that there will ever be a completely satisfactory
response to cleaning up an arctic offshore oil spill other than preventing it from occurring." Weeks
& Weller, Offshore Oil in the Alaskan Arctic, 225 Science 371, 377 (1984).
19. The north slope of the Alaskan Arctic, specifically the land from the Brooks range to the
coastline, is under the municipal jurisdiction of the North Slope Borough. See Figure 1. Formed in
1972, the North Slope Borough is the largest municipality geographically in the nation complete
with a home rule
charter, and the power to tax, educate, assess, plan, and zone. Supreme Court
Rejects California's OCS-CZM Consistency Claim, Arctic Pol'y Rev., March- May 1984, at 3.
20. See Minerals Mgmt. Serv., Dep't of Interior, I Final Environmental Impact Statement Diapir
Field Lease Offering 111-62 (June 1984) [hereinafter FEIS Diapir Field Lease Sale 871.
21. Act of July 7, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-508, 72 Stat. 339; Jones 1986, supra note 11,
at 86
n.207. Alaska became a state with less than one percent of its land in private ownership Under the
Statehood Act the state government was entitled to choose 104 million acres, about 40 percent, out
of the public domain of the original territory. Waybum, Alaska: The Great Experiment, 13 Ambio
249, 250 (1984).
22. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1628 (1982).
23. Twelve regional corporations and nearly 150 village corporations were established. The regional corporations own both the surface and subsurface rights of their land and the subsurface rights
to the village corporations in their region while the village corporations own the surface rights to
their own land. Waybum, supra note 21, at 251. Native Alaskans were enrolled in the appropriate
corporation and issued stock. See Jones 1986, supra note 11,at 88. For discussion of Native land
rights under ANCSA, see id. at 84-88, 87 n.2 10.
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ANCSA 24 for the preservation of their scenic and wildlife values was
settled with the Alaska National Interest Lands and Conservation Act
(ANILCA) in 1980.' The intricate pattern of land ownership in the
Alaskan Arctic is a dynamic factor in oil and gas development.

Oil and Gas Development
The Alaskan Arctic has already undergone intense onshore development
at the Prudhoe Bay production complex. Also, many areas both on land
and offshore in state and federal waters have been leased to the oil industry
for exploration and possible development, as Figure 1indicates.' Because
Figure 1 only depicts current production and leased areas, it does not
reflect that much of the Arctic has been offered for lease since the state
began leasing tracks in 1964.27
As of late 1989 the state of Alaska has offered 18 competitive oil and
gas lease sales both offshore and on land and has three more sales scheduled by 1992 in its five-year leasing plan. 2 On the OCS, numerous tracts
have been leased as a result of five OCS lease sales-four in the Beaufort
Sea and one in the Chukchi Sea. 9 One OCS lease sale is scheduled in
1991 for each sea under the new federal five-year leasing plan? 0 Tracks
24. 43 U.S.C. § 1616(d)(2)(A) (1982).
25. 16 U.S.C. §§3101-3233 (1982 & Supp. 1987). ANILCA designated 131 million acres as
national wildlife refuges, national parks, and other federal lands to be managed by federal agencies
to preserve their wilderness and cultural values in perpetuity. Waybum, supra note 21, at 52. With
89% of Alaska owned by the federal government, ANILCA is viewed by the state as afederal "lock
up" of Alaska's resources. Jones, Major Issues in Developing Alaska's Outer Continental Shelf Oil
and Gas Resources, I Alaska L. Rev. 209, 262 n. 310, 362 n. 313 (1984) [hereinafter Jones 19841.
For a discussion of the struggle for land ownership in Alaska, see generally Jones 1984; Wayburn,
supra note 21, at 251-53. ANILCA also provided for the continuation of the opportunity for subsistence use on the designated lands. 16 U.S.C. H 3111-3226 (1982 & Supp. V 1987). See infra
text accompanying notes 313-19.
26. This map only indicates current production, exploration, and leasing activity in the Alaskan
Arctic, with the exception of some leased tracts in the National Petroleum Reserve-Alaska, some
leased tracts adjacent to the state oil and gas unit boundaries, and tracts leased from three state
offshore lease sales and from one onshore lease sale held since January 1987. Proposed state lease
sales planned by the state five-year leasing program will offer almost all of the state offshore waters
of the Arctic for lease by 1991. Minerals Mgmt. Serv., Dep't of Interior, Final Environmental Impact
Statement Alaska Outer Continental Shelf Beaufort Sea Sale 97, graphic 6 at IV-A-29 (1987)
[hereinafter FEIS Beaufort Sea Lease Sale 97]; Minerals Mgmt. Serv., Dep't of Interior, Draft
Environmental Impact Statement OCS Proposed Oil and Gas Lease Sale Chukchi Sea Sale 109,
graphic 3 at IV-A-2 (1987); D. Slitor & J. Weise, Alaska Summary/Index: January 1986-December
1986, at 34 (OCS Information Report MMS 87-0016, 1987) [hereinafter Slitor & Weise 1987].
27. For a complete list of Alaskan state lease sale and development activity in the Arctic, see
Slitor & Weise 1987, supra note 26, at 33-46.
28. Id. at 34, 40-45; D. Slitor & J. Weise, Alaska Update: January 1987-August 1988, at 23
(OCS Information Report MMS 88-0073, 1988) [hereinafter Slitor & Weise 1988].
29. Slitor & Weise, supra note 26, at 22.
30. Id.; Dep't of Interior, Five-year Leasing Program Mid-1987 to Mid-1992, at 6 (1987) [hereinafter Five-year Plan 1987-1992].
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have also been leased on private onshore land owned by the Arctic Slope
Regional Corporation (ASRC)." The Federal Government has also held
large lease sales in the National Petroleum Reserve-Alaska (NPR-A), but
few tracks were leased since the oil industry showed little interest. 2

Development based on these lease sales has been primarily limited to the

Prudhoe Bay area, 3 but large parcels of land continue to be offered under
aggressive state and federal lease sale schedules. These lease sales will
facilitate the continued spread of oil and gas development throughout the

Arctic.
To date, all Arctic oil production has been on state lands from the
Prudhoe Bay complex which has produced over 5.7 billion barrels of
oil.' Annual production from Prudhoe Bay represented 18 percent of the
nation's domestic oil production in 1982." Only recently has production
begun offshore in state waters adjacent to the onshore Prudhoe Bay production area. 6 As of January 1989, exploration activity totaled 64 wells, 7

45 on state tracts and 18 on federal OCS tracts.' 8 Five OCS wells have
discovered quantities of oil considered economically feasible to produce, 9
and a sizeable discovery was made recently in OCS waters off the coast

of the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge.' A total of 32 islands have been
either constructed or developed in the Beaufort Sea to accommodate
federal and state exploratory drilling. 4' Exploration on ASRC leases has
included a wildcat well on tracts within the Arctic National Wildlife
Refuge's coastal plain. 42 Across the Canadian border, oil development
3 1. This is the regional corporation for Native residents of the North Slope Borough as established
by ANCSA.
32. J. Deis & R. Pierson, Arctic Summary Report Update Sept. 1983, at 12-14 (1983) (prepared
for Minerals Mgmt. Serv., Dep't of Interior).
33. See infra text accompanying notes 36-42.
34. Slitor & Weise 1987, supra note 26, at 40, 45.
35. A Quiet Man for Oil Leasing, Businessweek, Aug. 30, 1982, at 75.
36. The first offshore production in the Arctic began in late 1987 in state waters in the Endicott
reservoir. Slitor & Weise 1987, supra note 26, at 40-45. State production is occurring in five
reservoirs: Prudhoe Bay, Kupark, Lisbume, Endicott, and MiMe Point. State offshore development
is also occurring in the Lisburne field, but is not at the production stage. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 18-29.
39. Id.
40. One ANWR Area Wildcat Hits Oil; Another, Court, Oil & Gas J., May 23, 1988, at 22
[hereinafter ANWR Area Hits Oil].
41. Sixteen of the islands have been artificial gravel islands and two have been manmade ice
islands. Only four were constructed on federal leases. FEIS Beaufort Sea Lease Sale 97, supra note
26, at app. G, Table G-9.
42. FEIS Beaufort Sea Lease Sale 97, supra note 26, at graphic 6; ANWR Area Hits Oil, supra
note 40, at 22.
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off the MacKenzie Delta in the Beaufort Sea is expected to begin production in the next two years. Short-term transportation plans call for
shipping oil by tanker through the Alaskan Beaufort Sea and through the
Bering Strait.43 The oil industry has sunk tens of billions of dollars into
leases," exploration, and the TransAlaska Pipeline (TAPS), 4" and con-

tinues to commit billions of dollars to future production and exploration.46
This heavy investment is evidence of the industry's long-term commit-

ment to oil and gas development in the Arctic.
Ecological and Cultural Impacts from Oil and Gas Development
The development of offshore oil and gas resources involves highly
complex and extensive technological processes that occur in both the
ocean and coastal zone as hydrocarbons are extracted, piped, shipped,
and refined.47 Recent assessment of the Prudhoe Bay oil production complex has revealed that the ecological damage, especially to the Arctic

thaw-lake plains and other wetlands, is much more extensive and serious
than predicted." Enforcement of environmental regulations and industrial
monitoring at Prudhoe Bay have also been very poor.49 Direct loss of

habitat from production around Prudhoe Bay has totaled nearly 10,000
43. 12th Annual Review of Hydrocarbon Development in the Beaufort Sea, 2 Arctic Res. of the
U.S. 55 (Spring 1988).
44. The Beaufort Sea OCS lease sale 71 in 1982 produced a record value in total bids for any
Alaska OCS lease sale of over $2 billion. Oil and Gas Leases to be Auctioned Off inAlaska Wednesday,
Wall St. J., May 24, 1982, at 4, col. 2. With the depressed oil market, recent Alaska OCS lease
sales have not come near this value; however, high bids for certain tracts indicate the industry's
continued interest. Offshore ANWR Hotspot of Beaufort Sea Sale 97, Oil & Gas J., May 23, 1988,
at 22. During the latest Beaufort Sea OCS lease sale number 97, tracts off of the coast of the Arctic
National Wildlife Refuge that received a combined total bid of $50.5 million were the sole hotspot.
The total sale produced over $118 million in bids. Id.
45. Alaska Squares Off on Bristol Bay Oil Drilling: Fishing is Given Priority in Opposition to
FederalLeases, Wall St. J., Sept. 16, 1985, at 6, col. I. By 1994, production in Prudhoe Bay field
will drop 50% and the flow from the other currently producing fields in the Prudhoe Bay area will
begin to decline. Slitor & Weise 1987, supra note 26, at 44. A major incentive to expanding oil
production is to maintain economical flow rates in TAPS in order to earn the return on this investment.
46. Arco Alaska Inc. has plans to spend $7 billion over the next ten years in exploration and to
enhance recovery in producing fields. ARCO Plans $7 Billion Spending in Alaska, Oil & Gas J.,
Feb. 29, 1988, at 19.
47. See Bolze & Lee, Offshore Oil and Gas Development: The Ecological Effects Beyond the
Offshore Platform, in Proceedings of Sixth Symposium on Coastal and Ocean Management, 1920,
passim (1989) (held July 11-14, 1989 in Charleston, SC); see also Jones, Harvesting the Ocean's
Resources: Oil or Fish?, 60 S. Cal. L. Rev. 585, 611-16 (1987) [hereinafter Jones 19871.
48. U.S. Fish and Wildlife Serv., Dep't of Interior, Comparison of Actual and Predicted Impacts
of the Trans-Alaska Pipeline System and Prudhoe Bay Oilfields on the North Slope of Alaska 7, 51
(1987) [hereinafter TAPS Impacts); Walker, Webber, Binnian, Everett, Lederer, Nordstrand, &
Walker, Cumulative Impacts of Oil Fields on NorthernAlaskan Landscapes, 238 Science 757, 75960 (1987).
49. TAPS Impacts, supra note 48, at 4.
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acres due to the construction of roads, 0 platform pads, and over 250
open pits each storing 13 million gallons of drilling muds and other

wastes." The discharge procedures for these pit wastes,' 2 the annual

emission of 9,000 to 27,000 tons of nitrogen oxides into the air, and the
release of solid hazardous wastes and other wastes have resulted in wide-

spread pollution.' 3 Habitat loss and pollution will spread as further con-

struction is required to accommodate new production from offshore and
land-based sites.' 4
Although considerable research has resolved many questions, the assessment of the ecological effects from offshore oil and gas development
is still full of uncertainties." The long-term effects from oil spills and
related activities, especially at the ecosystem level, to coastal marine
communities, fishery stocks,' 56 concentrated wildlife populations, and wetlands still need to be researched.' 7 The risk of oil spills in the Beaufort
and Chukchi seas is a major concern because of the potential harm to the
endangered Bowhead whale and other marine mammals.' 8 The effects of
oil spills to coastal areas are the most long term for shallow protected
areas such as the lagoons and deltas which occur throughout the Arctic.' 9
50. The breakdown in direct habitat loss includes 5500 acres of gravel pads, 300 miles of roads,
720 acres of open gravel pits, and 3400 acres that have been flooded due to impounding by roads
and pads. L. Speer & S. Libenson, Oil in the Arctic: The Environmental Record of Oil Development
on Alaska's North Slope, at v (1988) [hereinafter Speer & Libenson].
51. Id. at ii, 1. Many pits have elevated levels of such toxic substances as heavy metals and
hydrocarbons. Id. at v. Direct loss of wildlife habitat has totaled 22,000 acres, much more than
predicted, when the construction and operation of TAPS is included. TAPS Impacts, supra note 48,
at 51.
52. Fluid wastes from reserve pits are pumped directly unto the tundra, sprayed on gravel roads,
and injected underground. Drilling muds are fluids used to lubricate the drill bit. In 1986, half of
these discharges violated state standards, a better record than in previous years. Speer & Libenson,
supra note 50, at iii.
53. Id. at iii, 21-29.
54. Scenarios assessing the cumulative effect of all Arctic oil and gas development to date predict
an additional 430 miles of pipeline, 216 miles of roads, three artificial islands in shallow waters,
increased use of floating drilling units for deeper waters, 51 exploratory wells, four production
platforms, 75 production and service wells, 54,275 tons of drilling muds, 214,650 tons of cuttings,
and 3,375 helicopter flights. Models predict 24 oil spills over 1000 barrels and at least one oil spill
over 100,000 barrels. FEIS Beaufort Sea Lease Sale 97, supra note 26, at Table II-A-t.
55. Boesch, Butler, Cacchione, Geraci, Neff, Ray & Teal, An Assessment of the Long-term
Environmental Effects of U.S. Offshore Oil and Gas DevelopmentActivities: Future Research Needs,
in Long-term Environmental Effects of Offshore Oil and Gas Development 1, 50 (D. Boesch & N.
Rabalais eds. 1987) [hereinafter Long-term Effects].
56. For details on the effects of OCS oil and gas development on fisheries and fish stocks, see
Jones 1984, supra note 25, at 224-36.
57. Long-term Effects, supra note 55, at 29.
58. See Bolze & Lee 1989, supra note 10. The National Marine Fisheries Service, in its biological
opinion for the Beaufort Sea OCS lease sale 87, determined that a major blowout during the spring
migration of the Bowhead would jeopardize the future existence of the species. FEIS Diapir Field
Lease Sale 87, supra note 20, at app. D.
59. Teal & Howarth, Oil Spill Studies: A Review of Ecological Effects, 8 Envtl. Mgmt. 27, 29
(1984).
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The industry's approved oil spill clean-up response program forthe Arctic,
which is based on technology developed for climatic conditions in the
Gulf of Mexico, has failed to perform effectively under Arctic sea ice
conditions.' The effect of OCS development on subsistence culture is
also a prominent issue to Alaskan Natives. They are concerned that the
ecological damage from oil development and increased recreational harvesting from the continuous influx of non-Native oil industry employees
will significantly reduce fish and wildlife populations which Natives rely
on for food.6
THE STATUTORY FRAMEWORK FOR OCS OIL
AND GAS DEVELOPMENT
The hydrocarbon resources of the OCS are only some of the many
mineral, renewable, and biological resources of the marine and coastal
environment. Numerous statutes are involved in managing the ocean
environment. Some are oriented toward the protection of certain resources
and others mandate comprehensive management plans for designated
areas. However, most statutes are designed to regulate activities that occur
in the marine environment.62 As a result, many agencies have jurisdiction
over the offshore and coastal environments, yet are responsible for programs with potentially conflicting objectives.63
Extracting and producing the oil and gas resources of the OCS involves
extensive development far beyond the offshore drilling platform. Because
of the wide range of activities involved in OCS development, from laying
offshore pipelines to building housing facilities, it is subject to many
statutes and is regulated by many federal and state agencies. At least 30
federal statutes affect OCS oil and gas development.' Tables I and 2
present a list of the predominant statutes and agencies involved in OCS
development in the Arctic. The management of the OCS has been profoundly affected by a statutory framework that is an amalgamation of
many independently designed statutes, some with potentially conflicting
mandates.65
60. State Lifts Beaufort Sea Broken-Ice Restrictions, Arctic Pol'y Rev., Jan. 1985 at 9; see supra
note 18.
61. Jones 1986, supra note I1, 66 n.64, 66-68; see also cases infra note 313.
62. For a more in depth discussion of the three types of statutes that affect marine resources, see
Finn, InteragencyRelationships in Marine Resource Conflicts: Some Lessons from OCS Oil and Gas
Leasing, 4 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 359, 362-64 (1980).
63. Id. at 360.
64. Minerals Mgmt. Serv., Dep't of Interior, Leasing Energy Resources on the Outer Continental
Shelf, 31 (1987); see Table I.
65. See infra text accompanying note 162.
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TABLE 1. Predominant Statutes and Treaties Involved in OCS Oil and Gas
Development in the Alaskan Arctic
STATUTE

GENERAL PURPOSE

Alaska Coastal Management Act
(1977) (ACMA) 66

Establishes standards and guidelines
for development in Alaskan coastal
areas.

Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act
(1971) (ANCSA)o
Alaska National Interest Lands and
Conservation Act (1980)
(ANILCA)"
Arctic Research and Policy Act of
1984r

Settlement of Alaskan land claims
between Alaska and Natives.
Additional settlements of Native land
claims and designation of federal
land in Alaska for preservation.
Formulates comprehensive national
policy on research needs in the
Arctic.

Clean Air Act (1970) (CAA) 70

Establishes national ambient air
quality standards and policy for
prevention of significant
deterioration.
Requires permit to discharge
pollutants into navigable waters
and regulates oil spill control.
Aids states in development of coastal
management programs.
Establishes procedures and
regulations for operating and
locating deepwater ports.

Clean Water Act of 1977 (amending
the Federal
Water Control Act)
7
(CWA) 1
Coastal Zone Management
Act
72
(1972) (CZMA)
Deepwater Port Act of 19747'

Endangered Species Act of 1973
(ESA)74

Establishes policy to protect
endangered and threatened species.

66. Alaska Stat. §§44.19.155-62, 44.47.095, 46.40 (1977), reprinted in M. McCrea, Federal
and State Coastal Management Programs, app. A (Minerals Mgmt. Serv., Dep't of Interior, Reference
Paper No. 83-1, 1983); Alaska Admin. Code, tit. 6 § 50, § 80, § 85, reprinted in State of Alaska
Division of Gov't Coordination, Office of Mgmt. and Budget, Statutes and Regulations 25-51 (August
1984).
67. 43 U.S.C. H 1601-1629 (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
68. 16 U.S.C. § 1301-3233 (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
69. 15 U.S.C. §§4101-4111 (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
70. 42 U.S.C. §97401-7642 (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
71. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
72. Pub. L. No. 92-583, 86 Stat. 1280 (1972) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451-64
(1982 & Supp. V 1987)).
73. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1501-1524 (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
74. 16 U.S.C. § 1531-1543 (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
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TABLE 1, continued
STATUTE

Fish and Wildlife Coordination
Act
75
(1934) (FWCA)

Fishery Conservation and
Management Act (1976) (FCMA) 76
Marine Mammal 77Protection Act of
1972 (MMPA)
Marine Protection, Research and
Sanctuary Act of 1972 (MPRSA) 7
National Environmental Policy Act of
1969 (NEPA) 79

National Gas Policy Act (19 7 8 )80
and Natural Gas Act (1938)" t
National Historic 82
Preservation Act
(1966) (NHPA)
North Slope Borough Coastal
Management Plan (1988) s3
North Slope Borough Comprehensive
Plan (1982)"
Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act
(1953) (OCSLA) and Amendments
(1978) (OCSLAA) 5

GENERAL PURPOSE

Requires interagency consultation
with Fish and Wildlife Service on
federal construction activity
affecting wildlife.
Institutes policy to conserve and
manage continental shelf fishery
resources.
Requires restoration of marine
mammal populations of habitat.
Title 1--Ocean dumping regulations.
Title Ill-Marine sanctuary
program.
Requires that all federal agencies
prepare an EIS for any major
activity significantly affecting the
environment.
Both statutes regulate commerce in
natural gas and control interstate
transport and sale of natural gas.
Requires preservation of historic
properties in the United States.
Approved North Slope Borough
coastal management plan under the
CZMA and ACMA.
The North Slope Borough zoning and
permit system.
Authorizes federal management of
the hydrocarbon resources of the
OCS.

75. 16 U.S.C. §§661-666e (1982).
76. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1882 (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
77. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1361-1407 (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
78. Title I-Ocean Dumping, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1401-1445 (1982 & Supp. V 1987); Title 11-Marine
Sanctuaries Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1431-1434 (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
79. 42 U.S.C. §§4321-4370 (1976 & Supp. V 1980).
80. 15 U.S.C. §§3301-3432 (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
81. Id. at §717 (1982).
82. 16 U.S.C. §470 (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
83. Effective May 6, 1988. Slitor & Weise 1988, supra note 28, at 38.
84. North Slope Borough tit. 19 § 80 (1982); see FEIS Diapir Field Lease Sale 87, supra note
20, at 111-64.
85. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1356, 1801-66 (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
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TABLE 1, continued
GENERAL PURPOSE

STATUTE

Port and Tanker Safety Act (1978)"

Rivers and Harbors Act (1899)7

Regulates navigation and vessel
safety and protects the marine
environment.
Requires permits for all offshore
construction in navigable waters.
PURPOSE

TREATY

Convention with the USSR on the
Conservation of Migratory Birds
and Their Environment (1976)
Multilateral Conservation of Polar
Bears (1973)

Prohibits taking of birds that migrate
between the two countries.
Signatory countries border the Arctic.
Prohibits taking of Polar Bears.

TABLE 2. The Majority of Federal Agencies Involved in Alaskan OCS Oil and
Gas Development
AGENCY

Advisory Council on Historic
Preservation
Army Corps of Engineers
Coast Guard
Environmental Protection Agency
Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission
Fish and Wildlife Service
Minerals Management Service
National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration
National Marine Fisheries Service
Office of Coastal Zone
Management

PRIMARY STATUTES DELEGATING
AUTHORITY

NHPA
Rivers and Harbors Act, OCSLAA,
CWA
Port and Tanker Safety Act, CWA,
Deepwater Port Act
CWA, MPRSA-Title I
OCSLAA, Natural Gas Policy Act,
Natural Gas Act
FWCA, ESA, OCSLAA
OCSLA, OCSLAA
MPRSA-Title Ill
MMPA, ESA, FWCA, OCSLAA,
FCMA
CZMA

86. Pub. L. No. 95-474, 92 Stat. 1471 (1978) (amending Port and Waterway Safety Act of 1972,
current version at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1221-1232 (1982 & Supp. V 1987) and 46 U.S.C. §391a (1982)).
For other statutes that regulate maritime transportation and construction, see Finn, supra note 62,
at 362 n.18 (1980),
87. 33 U.S.C. §§401426 (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
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Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act and Amendments
The policy and regulatory frameworks for developing the OCS oil and
gas resources are mandated under the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act
Amendments of 1978" (OCSLAA) which significantly amended the Outer
Continental Shelf Lands Act of 19539 (OCSLA). ° OCSLA established
federal jurisdiction over the outer continental shelf and provided the
Secretary of Interior with broad authority,9 essentially a carte blanche,92
to lease and develop the oil and gas resources of the OCS with little
policy guidance.93 The Santa Barbara oil spill in 1969, the OPEC oil
crisis of 1973-1974, and dissatisfaction with the regulatory framework
of OCS development under OCSLA94 precipitated the OCSLA Amendments in 1978." Most of the issues that surrounded the passage of OCSLAA to improve the management of the OCS are still contested today,
over a decade later.
OCSLAA established that the national policy for the OCS resources
calls for "expeditious and orderly development, subject to environmental
safeguards. "9 The purposes of OCSLAA are to: expedite exploration and
development of the OCS in order to meet national economic and energy
needs;97 balance energy development with "protection of the human,
marine, and coastal environments";98 minimize conflicts with the use of
other OCS resources such as fish;" ensure state and local government

participation in OCS development policy; ° and compensate for damages
caused by OCS development.'' OCSLAA does not mandate the exploi-

tation of the OCS hydrocarbon potential at the expense of other coastal
and ocean resources.'0 2 Instead, it requires that the Secretary of Interior
88. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1356, 1801-66 (1982 & Supp. v 1987), originally enacted as Pub. L.
No. 95-372, 92 Stat. 629 (1978).
89. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1356.
90. The passage of OCSLA marked the culmination of a 15 year dispute between the federal
government and several coastal states over jurisdiction of the continental shelf. For a discussion of
the judicial and legislative history of OCSLA and the conflict over continental shelf jurisdiction, see
Jones 1987, supra note 47, at 593-96; Jones, Understanding the Offshore Oil and Gas Controversy,
17 Gonz. L. Rev. 221, 232-45, 232 nn.39-102 (1982) [hereinafter Jones 1982].
91. 43 U.S.C. § 1334(a).
92. Speer & Libenson, supra note 50, at 596.
93. Jones 1982, supra note 90, at 242, 242 n.85.
94. For a detailed list of complaints with OCSLA, see Jones 1982, supra note 90, at 245 n. 103.
95. President Nixon responded to the OPEC oil crisis by ordering the Secretary of Interior to
accelerate OCS leasing and to offer an unprecedented 10 million acres for lease in 1975 as part of
Project Independence. Jones 1987, supra note 47, at 595. Nixon's accelerated leasing policy fueled
the debate for amending OCSLA based on concern over the environmental damages from rapid
development. Id. at 596; Jones 1982, supra note 90, at 244.
96. 43 U.S.C. § 1332(3).
97. Id. § 1802(I).
98. Id. § 1802(2)(B).
99. Id. § 1802(7).
100. Id. § 1802(6).
101. id. § 1802(1-10).
102. See id. § 1332(3), § 1802(2), § 1802(7).
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balance environmental considerations, coastal state concerns, and oil and
gas development.' 3
Numerous provisions were instituted under OCSLAA to specify how

the Secretary of Interior will continue to conduct development of OCS
oil and gas resources. The Secretary is authorized to lease OCS tracts"
to the private sector for development according to a five-year leasing
program."'s The Department of Interior must receive a fair and equitable

monetary return for these leases."° All OCS development activity must

be approved by the Secretary °7 and must use "the best available and
safest technologies which the Secretary determines to be economically
feasible' 0 " to ensure strong safety and health standards. The Secretary
is empowered to enforce"° these and any other environmental regulations

that are promulgated under OCSLAA" ° and must cooperate with other

agencies in enforcing all applicable regulations promulgated under other
statutes. "' One of the most significant features of OCSLAA requires the
Secretary to consult with affected coastal states over proposed lease sales
and proposed exploration and production plans." 2 Other features" 3 include a revision of the lease sale bidding procedures in order to increase
revenues," 4 the establishment of two information gathering programs," 5
two funds to compensate for environmental damages," 6 and a program
103. Id. § 1802(2).
104. Id. § 1344.
105. Id. § 1334(a).
106. Id. § 1802(2)(C).
107. See infra notes 130-39 and accompanying text.
108. 43 U.S.C. § 1347(b). The Secretary has the discretion to eliminate this requirement where
s/he "determines that the incremental benefits are clearly insufficient to justify the incremental costs
of utilizing such technologies." Id.
109. Id. § 1348(a). This section also confers enforcement powers on the U.S. Coast Guard and
the U.S. Army.
110. Id. § 1334(a).
Ill. Id.
112. Id. § 1345. The Governor of an affected coastal state may make recommendations concerning
a proposed OCS activity which the Secretary must accept if they reasonably balance national interests
under OCSLAA with the state's concerns. Id. § 1345(c). However, the Secretary does not have to
accept the Governor's recommendations and his decision cannot be the sole reason for invalidating
a proposed activity unless the decision isfound to be arbitrary or capricious. Id. § 1345(d).
113. For detailed discussion of the various features of OCSLAA, see Jones 1982, supra note 90,
at 245-63.
114. 43 U.S.C. § 1337. For details on bidding procedures, see Jones 1982, supra note 90, at
251; Jones 1987, supra note 47, at597.
115. The Environmental Studies Program, 43 U.S.C. § 1346, isdesigned to gather baseline
ecological data on the OCS.The OCS Oil and Gas Information Program, id. § 1352(a), requires the
Secretary to have access to all
data and information obtained from exploration by the lessees. See
Jones 1986, supra note 11,at75.
116. The Offshore Oil Spill Pollution Compensation Fund, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1811-1824, and Fishermen's Contingency Fund, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1841-1847, were established to compensate for damages
from oil spills and for lost or damaged fishing gear respectively. See infra notes 251-52 and accompanying text.
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to provide grants to coastal states to mitigate losses and finance facilities
needed to accommodate OCS oil development. 7
One of the most important provisions of OCSLAA is section 1334(a)
which requires the Secretary of Interior to develop a five-year leasing
program. "' The leasing program establishes the size, timing, and location
of leasing activity on the OCS in order to meet the nation's energy needs '9
and to assure the receipt of "fair market value" for leased areas."2 Most
of the policy decisions occur during the preparation of the leasing program
which is revised periodically. The plan must consider the "economic,
social, and environmental values" of the OCS resources and the potential
impact to the "marine, coastal, and human environments." 2 ' Ultimately,
the timing and location of the leasing program must be based on a balance
between the potential for environmental damage, the potential for discovering oil and gas resources, and the potential for adverse impacts to
the coastal zone.' 22 The Secretary must also prepare an Environmental
Impact Statement (EIS),' 2 3 and consider suggestions from other federal
agencies, state and local governments, and the public.
The OCS oil and gas development program is administered by the
117. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1454-1456. Because grants from the CEIP are based on the level of OCS
activity which occurs adjacent to the state, the program is seen in part as a buy-out of state opposition
to OCS development. Miller, Offshore Federalism: Evolving Federal-State Relations in Offshore Oil
and Gas Development, II Ecology L.Q. 401, 423 (1984); see also id. at 422-24.
118. 43 U.S.C. §1344.
119. Id. § 1344(a).
120. Id. § 1344(a)(4).
121. Id. § 1344(a)(1). Under § 1344(a)(2), the
[timing and location of exploration, development, and production of oil and gas among the
oil- and gas-bearing physiographic regions of the outer Continental Shelf shall be based on
a consideration of-.
(A) existing information concerning the geographical, geological, and ecological characteristics of such regions;
(B) an equitable sharing of developmental benefits and environmental risks among the
various regions;
(C) the location of such regions with respect to, and the relative needs of, regional and
national energy markets;
(D) the location of such regions with respect to other uses of the sea and seabed, including
fisheries, navigation, existing or proposed sealanes, potential sites of deepwater ports, and
other anticipated uses of the resources and space of the outer Continental Shelf;
(E) the interest of potential oil and gas producers in the development of oil and gas resources
as indicated by exploration or nomination;
(F) laws, goals, and policies of affected States which have been specifically identified by
the Governors of such States as relevant matters for the Secretary's consideration;
(G) the relative environmental sensitivity and marine productivity of different areas of the
outer Continental Shelf; and
(H) relevant environmental and predictive information for different areas of the outer Continental Shelf.
Id. § 1344(a)(2).
122. Id. § 1344.
123. Id. § 1344(b)(3).
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Minerals Management Service (MMS) 24 in the Department of Interior.
The administrative program is an elaborate multi-step process based on
requirements under OCSLAA, the Secretary's interpretation of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA),"25 and the Council of
Environmental Quality's regulations. 26 The administrative process is divided into the pre-leasing phase and the post-leasing phase. The preleasing phase involves an elaborate series of steps that occur over the
one and one-half to two years which are needed to carry out a lease sale. 27
The most important step is the preparation of the EIS for the proposed
lease sale which incorporates public participation in decisions to cancel
the lease sale, to remove areas from the offering, to impose restrictions,
and so forth.' 28
The post-leasing phase involves the numerous steps required to operate
on a leased track, from exploration to relinquishment of the lease. 29 Any
activity on a leased OCS track must conform to13an approved Exploration
3
Plan.' 3° For areas outside the Gulf of Mexico,' a Development Plan 1
is required should recoverable amounts of hydrocarbons be discovered.
Secretarial approval requires that proposed plans provide for safe operations and protection of the environment 133 and is contingent upon prior
approval from the affected coastal state.' 34 However, once tracks are
leased only one EIS is required for an entire OCS area 3 to assess the
124. The MMS was created in 1982 from the merger between the Conservation Division of the
U.S. Geological Survey and the Bureau of Land Management by Secretarial Order No. 3701.
Comment, Prospects for Increased State and Public Control Over OCS Leasing: The Timing of the
Environmental Impact Statement, 21 San Diego L. Rev. 709, 722 n. 126 (1984).

125. 42 U.S.C. §§4321-4370 (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
126. See Comment, supra note 124, at 723-24, 724 nn. 136-138.
127. For details on the steps involved in the pre-leasing phase and the applicable regulations, see
Slitor & Weise 1987, supra note 26, at 72-73; Comment, supra note 124, at 722-23.
128. Comment, supra note 124, passim.
129. For details on the post-leasing phase and the applicable regulations, see Slitor & Weise
1987, supra note 26, at 73-76.
130. An Exploration Plan must contain a schedule of anticipated activities, a description of
equipment to be used, the general location of wells to be drilled, and other information. 43 U.S.C.
§ 1340(c)(3). An environmental assessment is required to determine if the activity is a major action
constituting the need for an environmental impact statement and an environmental report must be
prepared before an Exploration Plan is approved. 30 C.F.R. §250.34 (1988); Slitor & Weise 1987,
supra note 26, at 73.
131. 43 U.S.C. § 1351(a)(1).
132. A Development Plan may apply to more than one lease, and must describe the facilities and
operations to be constructed, environmental safeguards to be implemented, and expected rate of
development. Id. § 1351(c). An environmental analysis and an environmental report are required
before approval. 30 C.F.R. §250.34 (1988); see Slitor & Weise 1987, supra note 26, at 73.
133. 43 U.S.C. § 1340(c)(2); § 1351(d).
134. The state issues a certificate of "consistency" under the provisions of the Coastal Zone
Management Act of 1972, 16 U.S.C. § 1456(c)(3)(B). See infra text accompanying notes 152-62.
135. Because the Gulf of Mexico has undergone substantial OCS development, Congress thought
it inappropriate to require the submission of Development Plans or preparation of an EIS during the
post-leasing phase for the Gulf. Jones 1982, supra note 90, at 250 n.120.
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implications of development plans for various tracts. t36 Any activity can
be suspended, and any lease or permit can be cancelled, if continuation,

among other things, will cause serious harm or damage to the environ-

ment. 37 Lessees are entitled to compensation for cancelled or suspended
activity unless activity is halted because of regulatory violations' 31 or the
Development Plan is not approved by the state. ,39 The intent of this multistep administrative process, in which new assessments are required at
major stages in development, is to prevent an irrevocable commitment
to the extreme stage of oil production once any activity, from geological

surveys to exploration, has occurred in an OCS area.
Coastal Zone Management Act
The Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972 (CZMA) was passed in
order to provide effective management and protection of the coastal zone. "
Along with the 1976 amendments,' 4' the CZMA provides a second avenue

for state and local governments to participate in federal decisions on OCS
oil and gas development. 4 2 The CZMA gives the states legal consultative
power with the intent of establishing a more "cooperative federalism"
between the federal and state governments over OCS development. "'
Under the CZMA, coastal states are encouraged to develop a comprehensive management plan to guide coastal development.'" Once a state
coastal management plan is approved by the Secretary of Commerce, 45
it becomes federal law and all federal activities affecting the state's coastal
zone must be consistent with these plans. 4 6 Alaska developed an approved
coastal management plan in 1977 " which focuses on the protection of
subsistence hunting and fishing uses of the coastal zone. 4 The primary
136. The Secretary must declare the approval of one Development Plan in an OCS area as a
major federal action. 43 U.S.C. § 1351(e)(1).
137. Id. § 1334(a)(2)(A)(i).
138. Id. § 1334(a)(1-2).
139. Id. § 1351(h)(2).
140. Pub. L. No. 92-583, 86 Stat. 1280 (1972) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451-64
(1982 & Supp. V 1987)).
141. Coastal Zone Management Act Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-370, 90 Stat. 1013
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 5, 15, and 16 U.S.C. (1982)).
142. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451-1464.
143. Miller, supra note 117, at 403.
144. 16 U.S.C. § 1451 (i); see also Miller. supra note 1!7, at 415-34. As of September 1983, 28
of 35 eligible states and territories had approved coastal management plans. Miller, supra note 117,
at 416.
145. Miller, supra note 117, at 416.
146. 16 U.S.C. § 1456(c).
147. Alaska Stat. §§44.19.155-162, 46.40 (1988), reprinted in M. McCera, Federal and State
Coastal Management Programs, app. A (prepared for Minerals Mgmt. Serv., Dep't of Interior,
Reference Paper No. 83-1. 1983); Alaska Admin. Code, tit. 6 §§ 50, 80, 85, reprinted in State of
Alaska Division of Gov'tl Coordination, Office of Mgmt. and Budget, Statutes and Regulations 2551 (August 1984).
148. Miller, supra note 117, at 419.
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purpose of the North Slope Borough's Coastal Management Plan, which
went into effect May 6, 1988, 49 is the protection of subsistence resource
needs'5" and the minimization of the environmental impacts from oil and
gas development.' 5'
Once a coastal state has an approved coastal management plan, the
state acquires power over federal actions affecting their coastal zones
through the "consistency" provisions of the CZMA. Both federal activities 2
and private sector activities requiring federal licenses or permits'53 must
be assessed to determine if the activity is consistent "to the maximum
extent practicable" 54 with the state's approved coastal management plan.
For example, the state's approval of an Exploration or Development Plan
under OCSLAA is required under the "permit" consistency provision of
section 1456(c)(3)."55 If a state disapproves, a federal license or permit
cannot be issued unless the Secretary of Commerce overrides the state's
objections. 56 For federally conducted activities that "directly affect" the
coastal zone or for federal development projects in the coastal zone, under
sections 1456(c)( 1)157 and 1456(c)(2)" s respectively, the state reviews the
federal consistency assessment. However, a state's disapproval does not
prohibit the federal activity, though the federal agency's decision is subject
to judicial review.'59
State power at the initial stages of offshore development was eliminated
by the Supreme Court decision in Secretary of Interior v. California, o

in which the Supreme Court ruled that an OCS lease sale is not a federal
activity "directly affecting" the coastal zone and therefore is not subject
149. Telephone interview with Amy Kyle, Senior Analyst, State of Alaska Office of Management
and Budget, Juneau (Nov. 7, 1988); Slitor & Weise 1988, supra note 28, at 38. Because of delays
in approving the local coastal management plan for the North Slope Borough, the Borough developed
a zoning and permitting program under Alaska Stat. § 29.03.010 (1986). North Slope Borough tit.
19 § 80 (1982). Telephone interview with Karla Kolash, Director, North Slope Borough Coastal
Management Program, Barrow (Oct. 1984). For a brief history on the development of the coastal
management plan, see J. Jackson & F. Kurz, Arctic Summary Report: January 1983, 50-51 (Outer
Continental Shelf Information Program, Minerals Mgmt. Serv., 1983).
150. The NSB Coastal Management Plan dealt specifically with the protection of the Bowhead
whale migration, 2.4.3(b), protection of areas of beluga whale concentrations, 2.4.3(c), protection
of historical sites, 2.4.3(f), and set policy to avoid large scale movement of oil by tankers, 2.4.5.1 (h).
151. North Slope Borough Coastal Management Plan, 2.4.3, 2.4.6. The coastal management
plan preempts the borough-wide comprehensive plan in the coastal zone. FEIS Diapir Field Lease
Sale 87, supra note 20, at 111-64. The Comprehensive Plan's primary purpose is also the preservation
of habitat essential to subsistence culture. Id.
152. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1456(c)(1)-(2).
153. Id. § 1456(c)(3).
154. Id. § 1456(c)(1).
155. Id. § 1456(c)(3). Miller, supra note 117, at 425 n.161.
156. Miller, supra note 117, at 425.
157. 16 U.S.C. § 1456(c)(1).
158. ld. § 1456(c)(2).
159. Comment, supra note 124, at 716 n.67.
160. 464 U.S. 313 (1984).
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to state consistency review under section 1456(c)(1)." 6' The frustrating
record of state influence on OCS development decisions partly reflects
the conflicting statutory purposes of the CZMA, designed to protect the
coastal environment, and OCSLAA, designed to expedite OCS oil de-

velopment while mitigating environmental damage.,62

National Environmental Policy Act
The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 63' instituted funda-

mental changes in the nature of federal administrative processes by incorporating public participation and environmental analysis into federal
decisions.' The most important requirement specified by NEPA is that
all federal agencies prepare an EIS for "proposals and other major Federal

actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment."' 65
A federal agency is required by NEPA regulations to solicit public comment on a major action by submitting a draft EIS (DEIS) upon which
comments are made, holding public hearings, and preparing a final EIS

(FEIS) which addresses the public comments and presents any modifi-

cations to the initial proposal." 6 The sophistication and timing of this
commenting process is left to the interpretation of the responsible federal
agency, such as the Department of Interior in its development of the preleasing phase for OCS lease sales.' 67 NEPA therefore provides a third
avenue, in addition to the provisions under OCSLAA and the CZMA,
for opening up Interior's decisionmaking process on OCS development
to state and public participation.

However, NEPA does not specify any mechanisms for judicial review
in order to enforce its goal that federal agencies consider the environmental consequences of their proposed actions. '" Extensive case history
161. Id. For a complete case history, see infra note 287 and accompanying text.
162. See infra text accompanying notes 284-97.
163. 42 U.S.C. §§4321-4370 (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
164. There are three main components of the Act: a declaration of a national environmental policy
to produce "harmony between man and his environment" and promote efforts to "prevent or eliminate
damage to the environment," id. § 4321, a procedural basis for implementing the statute's purposes,
id. §§ 4332-4334, and the establishment of the Council of Environmental Quality. id. §§ 4341-4347.
For a discussion of NEPA, see Comment, supra note 124, at 718-21, 718 nn.88-112.
165. 42 U.S.C. §4332(2)(c). The EIS must discuss: the environmental impact of the proposed
action, unavoidable adverse environmental effects of the actions, alternatives to the action, the
relationship between short-term and long-term uses of the environment, and irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources relating to implementation of the proposed action. Id.
166. 40 C.F.R. §§ 1500-1508 (1985); see Comment, supra note 124, at 722 nn.120-24.
167. In 1982, the Department of Interior significantly altered its pre-sale planning process, partly
by reducing the total completion time from 42 months to 32 months. The time for commenting on
the DEIS was cut in half to just 60 days, and the preparation time for the DEIS to eight months
from 18 months. Comptroller General, General Accounting Office, Early Assessment of Interior's
Area-wide Program for Leasing Offshore Lands 45 (July 15, 1985) [hereinafter Area-wide Program].
168. Comment, supra note 124, at 719, 719 n.101. Review of an agency's compliance with the
procedural requirements of NEPA are therefore conducted under the Administrative Procedures Act.
5 U.S.C. §§701-706 (1982).
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on the statutory intent of NEPA has established a judicial review limited
to a procedural analysis of an agency's decisions."6 When using a procedural standard of review, a court is limited to determining if the federal
agency performed all of the required procedures 70 under NEPA and is
unable to consider the substantive quality of the decision.' 7 The proce-

dural nature of judicial review under NEPA gives the Secretary of Interior
a large amount of discretion over how much influence the public and
state and local governments has in his decisions.
Wildlife Conservation Statutes
Because of the significant if not potentially severe impact on wildlife
from OCS oil and gas development, especially in the Alaskan Arctic,
several statutes and treaties'72 that affect wildlife management and protection also influence OCS development. Two important protection oriented statutes are the Endangered Species Act of 1973 (ESA)' 73 and the
Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972 (MMPA) 174 both of which require
that federal activities do not "jeopardize the continued existence"' 75 of
77
endangered species or marine mammals.

176

Both acts prohibit "taking,"

which includes killing, possessing, or harassing any protected species or
destroying their habitat, 78 and both statutes give exemptions for Native
169. Stryker's Bay Neighborhood Council, Inc. v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223 (1980); Vermont Yankee
Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, Inc., 435 U.S. 579 (1978).
170. In reviewing an agency's compliance with NEPA, a court may review whether the agency
failed to complete an aspect of its EIS process; for example, failed to prepare or improperly prepared
a required EIS, failed to use the information in the EIS in making the decision, and/or failed to
have appropriate information in the EIS. Comment, supra note 124, at 720, 720 nn. 109-112.
17 1. Id. at 722 n. 124. The limited review of an agency's decision under NEPA derives from the
courts' established use of the "arbitrary and capricious" standard of review. Though some courts
have adopted the slightly more substantive "reasonableness" standard of review, in which the court
determines if the agency made a reasoned decision, the Supreme Court has recognized little difference
between the two standards. Marsh, Secretary of the Army v. Oregon Natural Resources Council,
109 S.Ct. 1851, 1860-61, 1861 n. 23 (1989). For a discussion of the case history of the procedural
judicial review under NEPA, see Martin, The Interrelationships of the Mineral Lands Leasing Act,
the Wilderness Act, and the Endangered Species Act: A Conflict in Search of Resolution, 12 Envtl.
L. 363 (1982).
172. See Table I. Though these treaties impart international implications to adverse affects on
treaty protected species from OCS oil and gas development, the influence of these treaties is quite
limited. Should violations of the treaties be brought, they would be brought primarily as a source
of embarrassment against the country in violation rather than to levy economic sanctions. Telephone
interview with Gerald Ried, U.S. Fish and Wildlife Serv., Alaska Office (October 1984).
173. Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1543 (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
174. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1360-1407 (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
175. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2).
176. See Table 1 for other wildlife protection statutes, including the Fishery Conservation and
Management Act which contains provisions for the management of fishery resources in addition to
regulating commercial fishing. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1802(9), 1853, 1854(c); see Finn, supra note 62, at
363 n.22.
177. 16 U.S.C. § 1538; Marine Mammal Protection Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1372.
178. Verges & McClendon, inupiat Eskimos, Bowhead Whales, and Oil: Competing Federal
Interests in the Beaufort Sea, 10 UCLA-Alaska L. Rev. 1,9 (1980).
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hunting, 7 9 However, the management of these acts is divided among two
agencies which can have differing objectives; the Department of Interior
through the Fish and Wildlife Service and the Department of Commerce
through the National Marine Fisheries Service."'
A vital component of the ESA and another wildlife management statute,
the Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act of 1976 (FWCA)"'8 is the requirement that federal agencies consult with the appropriate wildlife protection agency"' regarding the wildlife impacts of a proposed activity.
Though the FWCA requires consultation to ensure that "equal
consideration" ' ' s3 is given to wildlife values when undertaking federal
actions, " it is the-responsibility of the agency proposing the activity to
determine whether it has complied with the act. ' The ESA consultation
provision is more powerful, particularly since formal procedures for a
highly structured process are established in the statute.1 6 The basis of
the ESA consultation is the preparation of a biological assessment under
section 1536(b)'87 by either the FWS or the NMFS which establishes the
necessary alternatives that will ensure that the proposed activity does not
violate the ESA. s During the section 1536 consultation, no "irreversible
or irretrievable commitment of resources" can occur that would preclude
the choice of alternative actions. 8 9 However, for development that occurs
in stages, such as OCS oil and gas development, 90 consultation under
the ESA is limited to the particular stage under review. Thus, early stages
that are essential to later development could be approved even though
subsequent activities could or are known to "jeopardize" the future existence of an endangered species. Though the ESA consultation does not
provide for public comment, 9 ' it is a strong mechanism--stronger than
179. Schoolcraft, Congress Amends the Marine Mammal Protection Act, 62 Oregon L. Rev. 257
(1983).
180. The FWS manages the statutes for terrestrial species and certain marine mammals: polar
bears, sea otters, marine otters, manatees, and dugongs. Id. The NMFS manages marine fisheries
and the other marine mammals: whales, dolphins, porpoises, seals, and sea lions. Id.; Finn, supra
note 62, at 365 n.35.
181. 16 U.S.C. §§661-666 (1982).
182. Such agencies include the FWS, NMFS, NOAA, and state wildlife agencies. 16 U.S.C.
§ 662(a).
183. 16 U.S.C. §661.
184. Id. § 662(b).
185. Finn, supra note 62, at 384.
186. Id. at 382-83.
187. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(b); Verges & McClendon, supra note 178, at 9.
188. The proposed activity must not violate section 1536(a)(2), which requires that a federal
action can not "jeopardize the continued existence" of an endangered species. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2);
Verges & McClendon, supra note 178, at 9.
189. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(d).
190. See supra text accompanying notes 125-39.
191. Finn, supra note 62, at 382-85.
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NEPA's requirement of agency and public review-for interagency coordination. 92
Marine Protection, Research and Sanctuaries Act
Similar to the CZMA's mandate for comprehensive management of the
coastal zone, the Marine Protection, Research and Sanctuaries Act of
1972"" established a comprehensive management structure for the re-

sources in specific marine areas."' These areas were designated as marine

sanctuaries under Title III of the Marine Sanctuaries Act,' 95 thereby protecting and restoring their "conservation, recreational, ecological, and
aesthetic values.""' Once the Secretary of Commerce, through the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), 97 promulgates
regulations for managing a marine sanctuary, the Secretary has the power
to enforce the statute and regulations.' 98 Though development of the OCS
oil and gas resources within a marine sanctuary is possible, it is to be
balanced with the conservation of the other marine resources in the sanctuary.
In 1982, 18 sanctuary sites were proposed in Alaska. Five of the
proposed sites were in the Arctic,'99 but NOAA abandoned further efforts
on marine sanctuary proposals at that time.'r ° However, Congress recently
192. id. at 365.
193. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1431-1434 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980); Ch. 27--Ocean dumping, 33 U.S.C.
9§ 1401-1425 (1982 & Supp. V 1987); Ch. 32-Marine Sanctuaries Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1431-1434
(1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
194. Finn, supra note 62, at 364.
195. Marine Protection, Research and Sanctuaries Act of 1972, 16 U.S.C. § 1431-1434 (1976
& Supp. IV 1980).
196. 16 U.S.C. § 1432(a).
197. NOAA administers both the Marine Sanctuary Program, see 15 C.FR. §922 (1988), and
the Coastal Zone Management Program, see 15 C.FR. §923 (1988).
198. 16 U.S.C. § 1432(f). For details on Title Ill, see Finn, supra note 62, at 368. The President
is free to disapprove of a proposed designation without public explanation. This provision could
hinder an open decisionmaking process. Id. at 378.
199. The five sites are: the offshore waters of the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge with the outer
boundary following the 60-foot depth contour, the boulder patch just east of Prudhoe Bay where
the only known dense kelp bed in the Alaskan Arctic exists, Harrison Bay at the mouth of the
Colville River, the offshore area east of Point Barrow which includes the Plover Islands and Admiralty
Bay, and Cape Lisbume/Cape Thompson on the Chukchi Sea. Aquatic Resources Conservation
Group, Draft Working Paper on Marine Protected Areas and the U.S. National Marine Sanctuary
Program 155-67 (1987) (prepared for the Center for Environmental Education) [hereinafter Draft
Marine Sanctuary Report]. The North Slope Borough did not designate any Areas which Merit
Special Attention (AMSA) in its coastal management plan, though both Cape Thompson and Keseguluk Lagoon near Point Lay along the Chukchi Sea were identified for future AMSA consideration.
District Program Abstract for the North Slope Borough Coastal Management Plan (Sept. 1988)
(obtain from Div. of Gov'tl Coordination, Office of the Governor, Juneau).
200. Jackson & Kurz, supra note 149, at 65. NOAA's abandonment of the sanctuary selection
process in Alaska has been attributed to poor execution of the public comment procedures and
inadequate explanation of the program. Draft Marine Sanctuary Report, supra note 199, at 154.
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called for a doubling of the site evaluation list2"' for potential marine
sanctuaries and the list is under review, offering an opportunity to nominate Alaskan sites. The MPRSA's and the CZMA's requirement that
federal actions be consistent with approved comprehensive management
plans is the strongest statutory mechanism, in comparison to that of NEPA
and the wildlife protection statutes, for interagency coordination among
the various federal authorities with potentially conflicting objectives for
managing the coastal and marine resources,2
OFFSHORE OIL AND GAS DEVELOPMENT IN REALITY

The OCS Five-year Leasing Plan
In carrying out provisions of OCSLAA, the Secretary of Interior has
created a highly litigious atmosphere as the state governments, environmental groups, Native organizations, and other interest groups have confronted the Secretary over his statutory interpretations and administration
of OCS oil and gas development. Most of the policy decisions, especially
at the programmatic level, occur during the preparation of the five-year
leasing plan which represents the Secretary's overall policy for the OCS.
All three OCS five-year leasing plans that have been developed since the
passage of OCSLAA have resulted in law suits which have enabled the
courts to profoundly shape OCS policy.2 3
Only four percent of the United States OCS had been leased by 19792'
when Secretary of Interior Cecil Andrus under the Carter administration
proposed to offer 55 million acres2 5 of the OCS under the first five-year
leasing plan. The approved plan offered a total of 36 lease sales, 2' nearly
half of which were scheduled to occur off the coasts of California and
Alaska. 7 These states, the North Slope Borough, and several environmental groups' sued the Secretary over whether his plan complied with
section 18 of OCSLAA which establishes the criteria to use when preparing the five-year leasing schedule.'
201. The MPRSA was reauthorized with the passage of H.R. 4210, 100th Cong., 2nd Sess.

(1988).
202. See Finn, supra note 62, at 365.
203. See infra notes 210, 230, 248 and accompanying text.
204. Staff of House Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the Comm. on Interior and
Insular Affairs, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., Report on Secretary of the Interior James G. Watt's Fiveyear Oil and Gas Leasing Plan for the Outer Continental Shelf 1 (1983) [hereinafter House].
205. Jones 1986, supra note Ii, at 55.

206. Five of the 36 lease sales were reofferings. Fitzgerald, California v. Wat: Congressional
Intent Bows to Judicial Restraint, IIHarv. Envtl. L. Rev. 147, 154 (1987).
207. Id.
208. See House, supra note 204, at 6 n.16.
209. Suits were filed in July of 1980. Fitzgerald, supra note 206, at 154.
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Though the D.C. Circuit in Californiav. Watt (Watt 1)"0 remanded the
plan to the Secretary to bring it into compliance, 2 ' the court agreed with
many of the Secretary's interpretations of the act.2" 2 Both the court and
the Secretary interpreted section 18(a)(3), which is meant to balance
energy, environmental, and coastal factors,21 by prioritizing energy considerations over the other stated purposes of OCSLAA.2 14 The court also
agreed with the Secretary's assertion that the requirements to solicit comments from other federal agencies and state governments on the proposed
five-year leasing plan were strictly procedural.215 With the first approved
five-year leasing plan, not only was OCS oil and gas development prioritized over environmental concerns, but outside input on Interior's leasing
schedule decisions at the programmatic level was essentially blocked.

By the time the D.C. Circuit court in October 1981 had issued its
remand, James Watt had been appointed Secretary of the Interior by the

Reagan administration. Earlier that year, Secretary Watt had already submitted his proposed five-year leasing schedule for 1982-1987 to Congress, " 6 and after preparing more drafts to comply with the court's order,
Watt approved his final, program in July 1982.217 Watt's "accelerated"

leasing schedule planned to offer for lease nearly the entire OCS, almost
I billion acres, which was 20 times the acreage offered by Andrus, and
25 times the acreage offered from 1953 to 1980.2"' Forty-two lease sales
210. 668 F2d 1290 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
211. Leasing under the Andrus program was allowed while it was under revision. House, supra
note 204, at 6. Andrus had failed to comply with section 18(a) with his imprecise designation of
California, section 18(a)(2)(b) with his incorrect definition of environmental risks, section 18(a)(2)(G)
with his failure to conduct inter-regional comparisons of environmental sensitivity and marine productivity, section 18(a)(2) in general for violating several of the subsections, and section 18(a)(3)
by not balancing energy development, environmental protection, and adverse coastal impacts pursuant
to section 18(a)(3). See Fitzgerald, supra note 206, at 155-73, 198.
212. For example, the court agreed with the Secretary that under section 18(a)(2)(D), which
requires the Secretary to consider other uses of the OCS, that there were no irreconcilable conflicts
between OCS energy development and fisheries. Fitzgerald, supra note 206, at 158-60. But see
Jones 1987, supra note 47, at 647.
213. 43 U.S.C. § 1344(a)(3) (1982); see supra note 121 and accompanying text.
214. See Fitzgerald, supra note 206, at 164-69.
215. Under a procedural interpretation, the Secretary is only required to consider state comments
and explain why they were rejected. The Secretary does not have to meet .any standards when
rejecting comments nor can the courts examine the validity of the Secretary's decisions. Fitzgerald,
supra note 206, at 169-70 and 169 nn. 126-29; House, supra note 204, at 36-40. Not only were
sections 18 (c) and (d) ruled to be purely procedural, but the Secretary with the court's concurrence
determined that section 19, which provides for consultation and coordination with affected state
governments, only applies to specific lease sales. Fitzgerald, supra note 206, at 170 & nn. 130-32;
House, supra note 204, at 39.
216. The Secretary of Interior can make changes to the five-year plan during its annual review
as required under section 18(e). House, supra note 204, at 6 n. 18.
217. Fitzgerald, supra note 206, at 175.
218. House, supra note 204, at 6 n. 19.
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were scheduled, with half of the acreage to be offered lying in the frontier
area off of Alaska.2" 9 A major justification for the leasing program was
the need to reduce the national deficit, since federal revenues from OCS
development are second only to income taxes as a source of federal
income." Watt estimated total revenues at the end of his leasing program
in 1987 to be 90 billion dollars,22 ' but his economic assumptions have
been highly criticized22
In addition to this drastic plan to lease nearly the entire OCS, Watt
instituted fundamental changes to the leasing administrative process. The
new "area-wide" leasing program replaced the former "tract selection"
process by which the industry, states, and other groups nominated certain
tracts within a large area to be included or deleted from a lease sale.22 3
The U.S. Geological Survey then narrowed the choice of tracts to those
with the most promising hydrocarbon potential, and an environmental
impact statement was prepared only for these tracts.224 Under the areawide system, Watt divided the United States' OCS into 18 large planning
areas, ranging from 8 to 133 million acres,225 with lease sales offered
annually in planning areas within the Gulf of Mexico and biennially
elsewhere. An environmental impact statement is prepared for an entire
OCS planning area, and information is gathered on industry interest and
on other concerns which will determine the actual tracts to be offered,
though the tracts are not determined until right before the sale. 2 Tracks
are also no longer evaluated prior to the lease sale to set a minimum bid,
but are evaluated after bids are accepted based on the Secretary's revised
system.227

Watt's area-wide leasing program was highly criticized22 except by
the oil industry.229 Soon after Watt approved his leasing schedule, the
state of Alaska, four other states, and several environmental organizations
filed suit.230 The petitioners claimed that Watt's program violated most
of section 18, including section 18(a)(4) which requires the Secretary to
" ' Yet, the D.C. Circuit Court in California
assure a fair market value.23
v. Watt (Watt H) approved the Secretary's leasing program.232 By not
subjecting the Secretary's decisions to the same degree of scrutiny that
it employed in Watt I,2"' the court supported Secretary Watt's flagrant
219. Id. Though Watt justifies his accelerated leasing program by claiming that it will bring -in
needed federal revenues, over half of his plan involves leasing in frontier areas where there is little
infrastructure, difficult climates, new environmental conditions, and weak local economies. All of
these factors increase the cost of OCS operations and will delay production. Goldsmith, Economic
Constraintsto Development in a Remote Region, 13 Ambio 255 (1984).
220. Over 58 billion dollars in federal revenues have been generated by OCS activities from 1953
to the end of 1982. Jones 1984, supra note 25, at 249.
221. id.
222. Economic analyses by the Government Accounting Office, the Sierra Club, and others predict
that Watt's leasing program will actually produce losses. For a detailed discussion see, House, supra
note 204, at 55-62. See infra note 231.
223. House, supra note 204, at 7.
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disregard for OCSLAA. According to Congressional evaluations of the
Watt leasing program:
The results of [this] review and study strongly indicate that the
Secretary has based his program on flawed economic assumptions,
has misinterpreted important energy policy and national security issues, has fostered an atmosphere of confrontation with the States,
and has not followed the spirit and intent of OCSLAA. His program
may well result in delay and uncertainty in OCS development rather
than in the expedited and evenly-paced exploitation Congress envisioned in the Amendments."
Under the Reagan administration, the third and current five-year leasing
schedule for mid-1987 to mid-1992 was prepared by Secretary Hodel. In
developing the current leasing plan which was approved in July 1987,23
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. Id.; Fitzgerald, supra note 206. at 174-75.
227. See House, supra note 204, at 50-52; see infra note 246.
228. House, supra note 204 passim; Fitzgerald, supra note 206, at 175 n. 153; Jones 1984, supra
note 25, 250-62. Watt's area-wide leasing program has been highly criticized by many quarters
claiming that it will not assure a fair market value as required under section 18(a)(4); that the industry
will not be able to explore such vast acreage under Watt's schedule; that the Department of Interior
will not be able to manage the accelerated program; that environmental impact statements prepared
for entire OCS planning areas will not be nearly as useful; that there had been little participation in
the program's decisions by states, the public, or other federal agencies; that while expanding the
OCS leasing program the Secretary and Reagan administration also planned to make drastic reductions
in funding and staff for ocean and coastal programs; and that in general Watt violated the spirit and
intent of OCSLAA.
229. Hunt, The Oil Industry Position, in The Continental Shelf: Resources, Boundaries, and
Management 199 passim (1986).
230. California v. Watt (Watt 11), 712 F.2d 584 (D.C. Cir. 1983). The states of Alaska, California,
Florida, Oregon, and Washington filed suit and the environmental groups filed a companion suit on
July 22, 1982. Fitzgerald, supra note 206, at 176.
231. Fitzgerald, supra note 206, at 176. According to the criticisms, Watt's leasing plan will not
return a fair market value because the accelerated pace will reduce bidding values by flooding the
market and because of Watt's new bidding procedures. House, supra note 204, at 53. Since Watt's
program, nearly 60% of the tracks have received only one or two bids, yet analyses indicate that at
least half of the tracks must receive three or more bids for competition to ensure that fair market
values result, Id. at 50-51. As of 1980, the value of a bid per acre has decreased by half to $1092,
and tracks have only received 1.6 bids on average. S. Chasis and L. Spear, Comments of the Natural
Resources Defence Council on the Development of a New 5-year OCS Oil and Gas Leasing Program
(Aug. 27, 1984) (obtain from the New York City office).
232. Fitzgerald, supra note 206, at 198-99.
233. Id. at 154-55. The court under Watt I and Watt H utilized the same standard of review, but
Watt I involved statutory interpretations while Watt 11 involved the adequacy of the Secretary's
analysis. Therefore, in Watt I the Secretary's decisions were subject to strict judicial scrutiny, but
in Watt 11 the court could only set aside decisions that were arbitrary and capricious. The judicial
review was a hybrid standard: factual determinations were to be supported by substantial evidence,
and policy decisions were reviewed to ensure that they were neither arbitrary or irrational and would
be overturned if they did not follow congressional intent. According to Fitzgerald, the court in Watt
11 should have closely scrutinized Interior's decisions as it had done in Watt I. Id. at 199.
234. House, supra note 204, at 1-2.
235. Environmental Groups Seek To Curb Offshore Oil Plan, N.Y. Times, Aug. 28, 1987, at
A14, col. 4.
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Hodel strayed little from Watt's accelerated program or confrontational

spirit in administering OCS development.236 Hodel minimized the impact
of efforts on two fronts, in California237 and in Alaska,238 to incorporate
environmental considerations into the preparation of the lease schedule.
The new leasing plan has divided the OCS into 26 planning areas and
will offer over 50 percent of the OCS.. 9 for lease in 38 lease sales, one-

third of which lie off of Alaska."4 The pace of the lease sales has slowed
to a triennial rate for planning areas outside the Gulf of Mexico. Also,
for the first time, the leasing schedule has removed areas of the OCS
from further consideration during the next five years, the duration of the

plan.'" However, a deferral from the five-year plan only prohibits leasing
in these OCS areas and does not offer any permanent protection.
Hodel's plan has deferred over 650 million acres,242 though most of
this acreage is in deepwater beyond the industry's current technological
capabilities. The plan has removed some ecologically sensitive areas in
California243 and in Alaska2' from the lease schedule. However, Hodel
236. For example, Hodel arranged secret deals in order to advance his oil development agenda
for the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge. In July 1986, the Interior Department secretly proposed to
swap 166,000 acres in the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge for 891,000 acres held by Alaska Native
corporations in other Alaska wildlife refuges. The Native corporations had arranged leasing contracts
with oil companies, but the deal was halted once public disclosure created an outcry. Peterson,
Alaska, U.S. May Lose in Oil Land Transfer, Washington Post, Nov. 16, 1987, at 5, col. 3; see
also infra notes 237-38 and accompanying text.
237. Hodet has continued to keep outside participation in OCS policy at a minimum even when
specially legislated to incorporate the states in its decisions. Confrontation has been so strong over
OCS leasing off the California coastline, that the Secretary of Interior was legislated to work with
a congressional panel to reach a consensus on leasing. Department of Interior and Related Agencies
Act, Pub. L. No. 99-190, § I 11,99 Stat. 1243 (1986); Department of Interior and Related Agencies
Act Pub. L. No. 99-591, § I 11, 100 Stat. 3341, 3261-262 (1986). The panel recommended that
certain lease stipulations to protect air quality, demonstrate oil spill clean-up preparedness, and others
be included as part of the leasing schedule for lease sales in California. Letter from the California
congressional delegation to Hodel (Mar. 4, 1987) (presenting their review of Hodel's proposed fiveyear leasing schedule). Hodel refused to apply stipulations at the programmatic stage, and only
required that the recommended stipulations be considered as part of the EIS for each California lease
sale. Five-year Plan 1987-1992, supra note 30, at 20.
238. A singular agreement was made among opposing groups over OCS oil and gas development
in the Alaskan Bering Sea in 1986 through the Institute for Resource Management (IRM). The
agreement was endorsed by several Alaskan villages, native corporations, environmental organizations, oil producing firms, and fisheries groups in 1986. For three Bering Sea OCS basins, millions
of environmentally sensitive acres were put off limits to drilling in exchange for uncontested exploration throughout the rest of the acreage in the basins. Wells, Oil Firms and Environmentalists
Reach Accord, Wall St. J., May 7, 1986, at 6, col. 1; Wells, Environmentalists, Big Oil Talk Truce,
Wall St. J., Nov. 25, 1985, at 6, col. 1. However, Hodel did little to recognize the importance of
the IRM agreement, though the five-year plan did defer some of the acreage recommended by the
agreement. See infra note 244 and accompanying text.
239. See infra note 244 and accompanying text.
240. Five-year Plan 1987-1992, supra note 30, at l.
241. Id. at 14.
242. Id. at 17-19. Many of these deferrals are around marine sanctuaries.
243. Id. at 18, 35-37.
244. Five Alaska OCS planning areas were deferred from Hodel's five-year leasing plan: St.
Matthew-Hall, Aleutian Basin, Bowers Basin, Aleutian Arc, and Kodiak, all in the Bering Sea except
the last. Id. at 24. The Department of Interior also deferred some of the acreage recommended by
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has planned lease sales for the first time off the Pacific Northwest, and
in areas that have been protected by annual Congressional moratoria on
OCS lease sale activities."4 Hodel claims to have refined the area-wide
process to "focus on. promising acreage," but the changes have been
minimal.' 4 The D.C. Circuit recently ruled in favor of Secretary Hodel
on all challenges except one brought by several states247 and environmental
organizations24 against his area-wide leasing schedule.249 The court found
that the Secretary had failed to adequately analyze under NEPA the cumulative impacts of the five-year plan on migratory species that move
through more than one OCS planning area, and has remanded the plan
to the Secretary for revisions.'

Environmental Considerations
Current judicial interpretation of OCSLAA has not made environmental
protection an equal priority to oil and gas development at the policy level;
yet OCSLAA still has several provisions for providing environmental
safeguards. The Offshore Oil Pollution Compensation Fund (Title 111) 25
the IRM Bering Sea agreement. Most of the acreage was not deferred as suggested, but was
highlighted in the five-year plan in order to get special mention during the individual lease sale
process. Id. at 19, 39-42. In the Arctic, the IRM recommended a small deferral around Point Barrow
which was only highlighted in Hodel's plan. Id.at 42.
245. Some OCS acreage proposed for leasing in Hodel's plan involve disputed territory off
Northern California, in Alaska's Bristol Bay, in Georges Bank off Maine, and around the Florida
Keys. Environmental Groups Seek to Curb Offshore Oil Plan, N.Y. Times, Aug. 28, 1987, at A14,
col. 4. For details on OCS leasing moratoria, see infra notes 328-32 and accompanying text.
246. Five-year Plan 1987-1992, supranote 30, at 1. The alteration to the area-wide process under
Hodel is merely the inclusion of a map indicating promising acreage for development in a planning
area during the first stage of a proposed lease sale. During this Call of Information step, the industry
can still indicate any tract of interest in the area, regardless of whether the tract is part of the
promising acreage. A second minor change involves an additional step at the beginning of the preleasing phase for potential lease sales in frontier areas, those in which no ease sale has yet occurred.
An assessment of industry interest is to be made before commencing any actions to determine if the
sale should be delayed, cancelled, or held. This assessment can be repeated for an area.
247. California, Florida, Massachusetts, Oregon, and Washington all filed suit. Environmental
Groups Seek to Curb Offshore Oil Plan, N.Y. Times, Aug. 28, 1987, at A14, col. 4.
248. Natural Resources Defense Council v. Hodel, 865 F.2d 288 (D.C. Cir. 1988). The petitioners
claimed among other points that the large planning area lease sales in Hodel's leasing plan violated
section 18(a)(2) which requires that a lease sale program only lease OCS regions with oil and gas
potential, violated section 18(a)(3) by undervaluing the social costs of leasing, and violated section
18(a)(4) by accepting the President's directive to reduce the minimum bid from $150 to $25 without
any public notice and comment. Brief for petitioners at ix, 39-44, 71-73, Natural Resources Defense
Council v. Hodel, 865 F.2d 288 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
249. 865 F.2d 288 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
250. Id. at 297-300. Grey whales and salmon were given as examples of species that migrate
through several OCS planning areas. The effects of "INTER-regional development" were not assessed
in preparing the leasing schedule. Id. (emphasis added).
251. OCSLAA §§ 301-15, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1811-24 (1982). The fund, not to exceed $200 million,
is financed primarily from a fee of three cents per barrel of oil produced on the OCS. id.§ 1812(d)
(1982). Parties may assert claims for economic losses from the cost of removing oil and for loss of
personal property. Id. § 1813 (1982); see Jones 1982, supra note 90, at 258-59.
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and Fishermen's Contingency Fund (Title IV)252 were established under
OCSLAA to compensate for environmental damages from oil spills and
to compensate for conflicts with the use of other ocean resources. To
minimize damage to the environment, OCSLAA requires all exploration
and development operations to conform to approved plans,253 provides
that any operation can be suspended or cancelled if a serious environmental threat exists,25 4 and requires that all new activity may be required
to use the best available technologies. 2" At a more programmatic level,
OCS areas can be deferred based on environmental considerations from

the five-year leasing schedule which will prohibit any lease sale in the
deferred areas for the duration of the schedule. Also, any particular lease

sale can be delayed or cancelled for environmental considerations. However, postponing or cancelling scheduled lease sales does not offer permanent protection for marine areas that would suffer irreversible ecological

damage from extensive OCS energy development, or from certain activities such as tanker transportation of oil.
Large bodies of regulations have been promulgated to ensure that safety
and environmental standards are met during OCS development, as required under OCSLAA. 2' In addition to issuing regulations as part of
the Code of Federal Regulations," 7 the Minerals Management Service
issues OCS orders, lease stipulations, and Information to Lessees (ITL's)
to address the different conditions in the various OCS areas. The Alaska
OCS orders" 8 have modified regulations, primarily for exploratory drilling operations,' in order to accommodate for the severe climatic con252. 43 U.S.C. § 184147 (1982). The fund, not to exceed one million dollars, is financed by
the collection of a fee of up to $5000 per year from holders of OCS leases, permits, easements, and
pipeline rights-of-way. Id. § 1842(b)(1) (1982). The fund provides compensation for lost or damaged
fishing gear and commercial fishing vessels. Id. § 1842(a). See Jones 1982, supra note 90, at 26061; Jones 1987, supra note 47, at 641-46. However, the Fishermen's Contingency Fund has not
met expectations since filing claims has proved difficult and the average processing time is almost
two years. Id. at 642.
253. 43 U.S.C. § 1340(c)(3) (1982); 43 U.S.C. § 1351(c) (1982); see supra notes 130, 132 and
accompanying text.
254. 43 U.S.C. § 1334(a)(2)(A)(i) (1982).
255. 43 U.S.C. § 1347(b) (1982 & Supp. 1987); see supra note 108 and accompanying text.
256. 43 U.S.C. § 1334(a) (1982).
257. Numerous titles in the Code of Federal Regulations have been modified to cover OCS
development. See Minerals Mgmt. Serv., Dep't of Interior, Legal Mandates and Federal Regulatory
Responsibilities for the Alaska Outer Continental Shelf 39 (Technical Paper No. 4, 2d ed. 1986)
(authored by S. Rathbum) [hereinafter Legal Mandates]; see Jones 1987, supra note 47, at 636 &
636 nn.295-303; see supra notes 130, 132 and accompanying text.
258. 47 Fed. Reg. 47,180 (1982), reprintedin Legal Mandates, supra note 257, at app. A.
259. Of the 14 Alaskan orders, six that primarily deal with production operations are still in
preparation. Legal Mandates, supra note 257, at 13. Most of the orders specify requirements for
exploratory drilling operations, and for handling drilling muds, a waste product. See id. at 13-15;
Jones 1987, supra note 47, at 637-38.
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ditions.7 Stipulations and ITL's are only specific to a lease sale. However,
the stipulations are the only legally enforceable part of the lease contract."6 ' ITL's are non-binding documents that serve to notify the operators
of the various laws that affect them and of the presence of legally protected
resources.
Both lease stipulations and ITL's, the weaker ad hoc approaches to
formal regulations and orders, have been used extensively in Alaska to
mitigate the effects from OCS hydrocarbon extraction on other marine
and coastal resources. Stipulations for OCS lease sales in Alaska have
restricted activities in order to minimize the effects on wildlife26 and
fisheries, and to reduce the risk of oil spills and other pollutant discharges. 63 In the Arctic where several OCS lease sales have occurred,
one of the most important lease stipulations has been a seasonal drilling
restriction during the Bowhead whale migration. Yet, for more recent
leases the drilling restrictions have been reduced to apply only during the
two-month fall migration. 2" Non-binding ITL's have been the predominant means of mitigation, especially for legally protected wildlife. 65
Also, Notices to Lessees are occasionally issued to clarify regulations.' 6
260. Jones 1987, supra note 47, at 637.
261. Id. at 638 & n.317.
262. Some of the stipulations that apply for the first three of the four OCS lease sales in the
Beaufort Sea include seasonal drilling restrictions during whale migration, protective measures for
cultural resources, a mechanism for conducting biological surveys to determine appropriate biological
protection measures, requirements to use pipelines to transport oil to shore, and specifications for
siting pipelines in order to preserve habitat. Minerals Mgmt. Serv., Dep't of Interior, Notice of Sale,
Oil and Gas Lease Sale No. 87 Outer Continental Shelf Diapir Field 14-18 (August 1984).
263. Slitor and Weise 1987, supra note 26 at 77. Many stipulations were attached to the leases
from the first OCS lease sales in the various parts of Alaska. In areas, such as the Alaskan Arctic,
where several lease sales have been held, the trend has been toward reducing the number of stipulations. Id.
264. Id. at 29-30. The original seasonal drilling restriction for the 1979 joint federal/state Beaufort
Sea sale was set such that drilling was only permitted between November I through April I. The
drilling restriction was reduced to two months based on the 1982 biological opinion from the NMFS.
Thus, for leases from the #71 Beaufort Sea sale, drilling was prohibited only between September
through October, which coincides with the fall Bowhead whale migration from Canadian summer
feeding grounds through the Alaskan Beaufort Sea to winter grounds in the northern Bering Sea.
Since most of the active leases are located in the western Beaufort Sea, the drilling restriction was
set only for the fall when the whales are in this area and not for the spring migration. The State of
Alaska also had imposed similar seasonal drilling restrictions in 1979, but has since reduced them
drastically. For state offshore leases, there are no longer seasonal restrictions for drilling from gravel
or natural islands, and drilling from floating structures is only prohibited during the fall migration.
The North Slope Borough challenged the Department of Interior over the decision to shorten the
drilling restrictions for OCS lease sale #71, but the U.S.District Court ruled against the borough,
and the appeal was also withdrawn. North Slope Borough v. Watt, No. 84-3672, 20 E.R.C. 1457
(D.Alas. 1984).
265. There have been numerous Information to Lessees issued for Arctic lease sales, many of
them focusing on wildlife concerns. Slitor and Weise 1987, supra note 26, at 78-79.
266. Id. at 80.
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In Alaska, the notices have primarily specified how to conduct preliminary
activities on a lease in order to avoid environmentally sensitive areas or
wildlife.267 The Notice to Lessees issued to those operating on leased
OCS tracts in the Beaufort Sea specifies the minimum distance that air
traffic must operate from Bowhead whales in order to reduce noise disturbance. Z65
Numerous other federal, state, and local laws provide for regulatory
measures to control environmental degradation from OCS activities.2
Thus, environmental mitigation of the vast array of OCS development
operations is controlled by a patchwork of regulations administered by
numerous agencies with various statutory objectives and overlapping jurisdictions.27 Some of the jurisdictional conflicts have been settled by
the Department of Interior,2"t which is required by OCSLAA to coordinate
the various agencies and regulations.27 2 As a result, before any OCS
activity is approved-such as constructing a gravel island for drillingnumerous permits, the typical regulatory vehicle, must be granted.273 The
industry contends that the controls on OCS development are a regulatory
quagmire that increases costs and delays production of new hydrocarbon
resources. 274
Environmental considerations are also a part of decisionmaking at the
267. Minerals Mgmt. Serv., Dep't of Interior, Notice to Lessees and Operators of Federal Oil
and Gas Leases in the Outer Continental Shelf, Alaska OCS Region (NTL 84-4) (Aug. I, 1984),
reprinted in Legal Mandates, supra note 257, app. B (specifying preliminary activities in the Gulf
of Alaska/Cook Inlet); Minerals Mgmt. Serv., Dep't of Interior, Notice to Lessees and Operators of
Federal Oil and Gas Leases in the Outer Continental Shelf, Alaska OCS Region (NTL 85-2) (Aug.
9, 1985), reprinted in Legal Mandates, supra note 257, app. B (specifying preliminary activities in
the Bering Sea).
268. Minerals Mgmt. Serv., Dep't of Interior, Notice to Lessees and Operators of Federal Oil
and Gas Leases in the Outer Continental Shelf, Alaska OCS Region (NTL 84-3) (July I, 1984),
reprinted in Legal Mandates, supra note 257, app. B. This notice gives details on how to conduct
geological and geophysical surveys on leases in the Beaufort Sea. Aircraft are required to operate
above 1500 feet in altitude and 500 yards laterally from any observed whales or in areas where
whales are believed to be present in order to reduce the effect of noise on the whales.
269. See Table I.
270. There are many state agencies that regulate aspects of OCS hydrocarbon development in
Alaska. Many of the state agencies are the equivalents of the various federal agencies in Table 2:
the Alaska Department of Natural Resources, the Alaska Department of Conservation, Alaska Department of Fish and Game, Alaska Office of Management and Budget, and the Alaska Department
of Health and Social Services, to list a few.
271. Various Memoranda of Understanding (MOU) have been issued to delineate regulatory
responsibilities when more than one agency has jurisdiction. For example, the Departments of
Transportation and Interior signed an MOU over pipeline safety regulations. 41 Fed. Reg. 23,746
(1976); see Legal Mandates, supra note 257, at 21-23; FEIS Diapir Field Lease Sale 87, supra note
20, at IV-18-19.
272. 43 U.S.C. § 1334(a) (1982).
273. For example, to construct a gravel island in the shallow waters of the Beaufort Sea, at least
17 major permits and many minor permits are required, and many of these permits are contingent
on having acquired others. C. Palmer, Presentation on America's Five-Year Offshore Leasing Plan:
Its Importance in Increasing Domestic Petroleum Reserves at the 23rd Annual Institute on Petroleum
Exploration and Economics (Wash., D.C., Mar. 10, 1983).
274. Interview with O.K. Gilbraith, Exploration and Production Manager, Alaska Oil and Gas
Association, in Anchorage, AK (October 1984).
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policy level during the analysis undertaken to prepare the EIS for a
proposed OCS lease sale. However, court decisions over lease sales in
Alaska have weakened this avenue of balancing OCS oil and gas devel-

opment with environmental concerns as well. Regulations issued by the
Council of Environmental Quality under NEPA require that a worst case

analysis be performed as part of the EIS when important information is
lacking for an agency making a decision on a major federal activity, such
as an OCS lease sale.275 Since important baseline data are still unavailable
for much of the Alaskan OCS and other frontier areas, the worst case

analysis is an important means of giving weight to the potential environmental effects from OCS development in the face of uncertainty. However,

the courts in two law suits over Alaska OCS lease sales have ruled that
a worst case analysis is not required at the lease sale stage.2" 6 Yet, if the
worst case analysis is delayed until the post-lease sale stage, it is more
difficult to cancel a lease, especially since large sums of money already
have been invested. 77 Ironically, the courts have justified their rulings
on compliance with OCSLAA to protect the environment upon two points:
OCS development is a step-by-step process that theoretically allows for
future evaluations, and environmental concerns can be mitigated through
regulations.278

In addition to reducing the legal clout of environmental considerations,
the courts have also typically deferred to the Secretary of Interior on

decisions involving technical information, especially where data are lacking and highly speculative.279 Yet the Department of Interior has decreased

275. 40 C.F.R. § 1502.22 (1985).
276. North Slope Borough v. Andrus, 642 F.2d 589 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (law suit over the joint
federal/state OCS lease sale in 1979), aff'g 486 F Supp. 326 (D.D.C. 1979); Village of False Pass
v. Clark, 733 F.2d 605 (9th Cir. 1984) (law suit over St. George OCS lease sale #70 in 1983),
aff'g 565 F. Supp. 1123 (D. Alaska 1983); see Comment, USDI'S Outer Continental Shelf Lease
Sale in the Beaufort Sea Contested, 21 Nat. Res. J. 943, 952-53 (1981). Not only NEPA but section
18(a)(2) of OCSLAA requires a worst case analysis because it is necessary to consider the relative
environmental sensitivity of the OCS regions in the face of the lack of scientific data. The Secretary
should have considered the impact from a large oil spill of 100,000 barrels. For a detailed discussion
of this issue see, Note, The Requirement of Worst Case Analysis When Approving Oil Leasing Under
the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act: Village of False Pass v. Clark, 347 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 347,
349, 355-56 (1985) (authored by James Hill, Jr.) [hereinafter Note 1985).
277. Note 1985, supra note 276, at 357.
278. Fitzgerald, supra note 206, at 160.
279. This decision by the court to defer on technical issues is not unusual in litigation over OCS
development, especially because predicting the environmental impacts is full of uncertainties. See
id. at 177. The Alaskan state courts have also deferred to the state agency's decisions regarding
technical matters on offshore oil and gas development in state waters. In Hammond v. North Slope
Borough, 645 P.2d 750 (Alaska 1982), the Alaska Supreme Court established a low standard of
review of the decisions by the Commissioner of the Department of Natural Resources to hold the
joint state/federal Beaufort Sea lease sale in 1979. Note, Oil and Gas-Offshore Leasing, 23 Nat.
Res. J. 479, 480 (1983) (authored by Carol 3. Ritchie). In reviewing decisions based on technical
issues, the court gave deference to the department and only applied a reasonable basis test. Id. at
481, 483. The Alaska Supreme Court's reluctance to review technically complex decisions and to
use a weak standard of review are in keeping with the various federal courts that have ruled on OCS
issues. See supra note 233 and accompanying text.
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funding to the research program by over 12 million dollars since 1981
even though ecological information on the Alaskan OCS is still far from

complete. 2" The Alaska region continues to receive over one-third of the
total funding, but the reductions have forced the cessation of important
baseline research such as the Bowhead whale census which the North

Slope Borough currently funds and conducts now that federal funding
has ceased.2"' There has also been a trend away from long-term baseline
data research which is vital to determining basic wildlife population trends
and toward short-term studies that are specific to topics of a particular

lease sale.2 82 Though the oil industry claims that it has conducted extensive
research on the OCS, industrial research in the Arctic has focused on
structural designs and climatology with little emphasis on oil spill pre-

vention and the data are typically confidential.2 3 A thorough scientific
understanding of the arctic environment is crucial to being able to develop
the OCS with the least ecological impact.

State and Public Involvement in OCS Decisions
With the passage of the OCSLA Amendments Congress intended to
increase the role of the state governments and the public in the decisionmaking process on OCS development, 2 but the Secretaries of Interior
under the Reagan administration managed to minimize outside participation in the administration and policy decisions on the OCS. The three
primary avenues for state and public involvement designed by OCSLAA,
the CZMA, and NEPA have all been restricted. Provisions under OCSLAA that the Secretary solicit public comment during preparation of
the five-year leasing plan, under section 18, and consult with affected
coastal states over proposed OCS lease sales, under section 19, offer only
a limited role for participation as a result of judicial interpretation of the
280. See Letter to William P. Clark, Former Secretary of Interior, by Rafe Pomerace for Friends
of the Earth, Sierra Club, National Wildlife Federation, Environmental Policy Institute, Natural
Resources Defense Council, and National Audubon Society, Feb. 15, 1984; Minerals Mgmt. Serv.,
Dep't of Interior, Oil and Gas Leasing/Production Program: Annual Report/FY 1987 at 21-22 (OCS
Report MMS 88-0009, 1987). In 1981, the Outer Continental Shelf Environmental Assessment
Program was funded at $36.6 million which was reduced to $23 million for 1987.
281. Thomas, The Role of the North Slope Borough in Arctic Environmental Research, 2 Arctic
Research of the United States 17 (Spring 1988); Annual NSB Bowhead Censusing, Arctic Pol'y Rev.
(March-May 1984), at 14. The census data are the basis for setting the annual quota for hunting
bowheads by Natives; therefore, when the NMFS funding was cut it behooved the NSB to fund the
census.
282. J. Grebmeier, The Role of Science in the Alaskan Outer Continental Shelf Oil and Gas
Leasing Decision Process (ms. 1984) (master's thesis from the University of Washington).
283. Merbs, Petroleum Industry Research in Arctic and Subarctic Frontier Areas, 2 Arctic Research of the United States 24 (Spring 1988). Since 1968, the oil industry has spent $81 million in
342 research projects. With most of the information confidential for a period of typically five years,
one questions how the data become available for use in making decisions on the OCS.
284. Fitzgerald, supra note 206, at 152.

Winter 19901

ARCTIC CONTINENTAL SHELF OIL AND GAS

law. 2' Critics of the effectiveness of OCSLAA's provisions wonder whether
the states' ability to influence decisions on OCS lease sales under section
'
19 "is not almost illusory." 286
Even with the "consistency" provisions under the CZMA, which enable
a coastal state to control how federal OCS oil development will affect
the coastal zone, the power of the states has been seriously eroded. With
the Supreme Court five-to-four decision in Secretary of Interiorv. Cal-

ifornia,287 which upheld Secretary Watt's determination that an OCS lease

sale does not affect the coastal zone, the coastal states are no longer able

to review a proposed OCS lease sale for its "consistency" with the state's
coastal management policies.288 Though post-lease sale activities are still
subject to state review and approval, the influence of the coastal states

is minimal at the preliminary stages where many of the policy decisions
are made. Soon after the Supreme Court decision in Secretary of Interior
v. California,legislation was introduced in Congress to overturn the court
ruling and clarify some of the statutory language. However, Congress
has yet to pass such a bill.289

The primary route for public and local government involvement in
OCS decisions is through the EIS process. Under NEPA regulations, a

draft EIS is first issued during the early stages of the planning process
to solicit public comments which are then incorporated into the final EIS.
Theoretically, this enables public input early in the decisionmaking process. 2' However, the actual timing of the draft and final EIS's during
285. In Watt i, the D.C. Circuit concurred with the Secretary Andrus that the notice and comment
provisions of sections 18(c) and (d) were only procedural. California v. Watt (Watt 1) 668 F.2d 1290
(D.C. Cir. 1981); see supra note 215. Under section 19, the Secretary must accept the recommendations of the state if they are reasonable; however, his decision to accept or reject the recommendations can only be vacated if it is arbitrary or capricious. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1345(c)-(d) (1982). The
D.C. Circuit in the same case extended the Secretary's already broad discretion under section 19
when the court chose to apply the less demanding "arbitrary and capricious standard" when reviewing
the Secretary's policy decisions instead of the stronger substantial evidence standard provided by
section 23 of OCSLAA. 43 U.S.C. § 1349(c)(6) (1982); Miller, supra note 117, at 436-38; see
supra note 233.
286. Comment 1984, supra note 124, at 718.
287. Secretary of Interior v. California, 464 U.S. 312 (1984). The Supreme Court reversed the
9th Circuit's decision that the Secretary of Interior is required to conduct a consistency review of
an OCS lease sale. 464 U.S. at 343. The litigation involved the state of California's challenge that
OCS lease sale #53 off its coast would affect the coastline and therefore must be reviewed for
consistency. But see Note, CZMA Consistency Review: The Supreme Court's Attitude Toward Administrative Rulemaking andLegislative Historyin Secretaryof the Interior v. California, 13 Ecology
L.Q. 687, passim (1986) (authored by Eric Esler) [hereinafter Note 1986].
288. See supra notes 152-62 and accompanying text.
289. Note 1986, supra note 287, at 711-13, 711 nn.182-92. The bills have explicitly defined
"directly affecting" which was a significant part of litigation on this section and the bills have
expressly stated that OCS lease sales are subject to consistency review. H.R. 3202, 100th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1987); S. 1412, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987). Supporters of the bills note that the
legislative history of OCSLAA and the NOAA regulations intended for the consistency sections to
require such a review of OCS lease sales. Note 1986, supra note 287 at 696-700, 707-08.
290. Comment 1984, supra note 124, at 721.

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[Vol.'30

the process of an agency decision is set by the agency,29 and Secretary
Watt greatly reduced the influence of the public through the EIS on OCS
decisions with his area-wide leasing program.29 2 Suggestions have been

made to modify the timing and sequence of events during the pre-leasing
phase in order to improve the public's effectiveness in analyzing the lease
sale. 93
The Reagan administration, especially under Secretary of Interior Watt,
has been noted for its lack of interest in coordinating with the states and
other interest groups over OCS oil and gas development. The Department
of Interior has been highly criticized for making minimal effort to co-

operate with the states as required by law. In addition, every year since
1982, the administration has proposed funding and staff cuts for CZMA
programs that are necessary for the states to mitigate coastal energy
development and for coastal management and protection. 95 These proposals for funding cuts and the termination of various coastal zone management programs have come at the same time the Department of Interior
has launched its accelerated offshore oil and gas leasing program. For
the past five years, the administration has also successfully fought the
efforts by the coastal states to obtain some of the federal revenues generated from OCS development. There is still no "revenue-sharing" mechanism which would funnel a portion of the federal revenue made from
developing the OCS to the coastal states which have to shoulder some
291. See supra note 167 and accompanying text.
292. The length of time for the pre-leasing process was reduced by nearly a year. The draft EIS
is now submitted only nine months before the lease sale is notified as opposed to the original 15
months. The result has been a collapse of the time to respond to the DEIS from four to two months,
and the Department of Interior prepares responses to the comments and issues the final EIS in only
three months, a month shorter than before the revisions. Area-wide Program, supra note 167, at 45;
see supra notes 167, 223-28, 246 and accompanying text.
293. Comment 1984, supra note 124, at 724-30. A significant alteration to the EIS process for
an OCS lease sale would be to issue the draft EIS before any call is made to identify tracks of
interest to lease or defer. This change would get local governments and the public involved much
sooner and equip them with the information in the draft EIS to make better judgments and comments.
One of the major problems with the current system is that tracks and areas are identified before any
information is disseminated which makes it very difficult for the public to make informed comments.
Id. at 722-23; see Siltor and Weise 1987, supra note 26, at 72.
294. The investigations by the House Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee for the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs concluded that "Secretary Watt has performed the bare minimum
by the laws regulating State participation in OCS decisionmaking. By cooperating with the States
only as he is required by the letter of the law, the Secretary has fostered an atmosphere of confrontation
with the coastal states." House, supra note 204, at 36.
295. Jones 1984, supra note 25, at 258-60, 259 n.292. Though the Coastal Zone Management
Program and Coastal Energy Impact Program have not been totally eliminated as has been recommended by NOAA, funding reductions of $5 million have been approved for the CZM programs
through 199 1. J. Blizzard, The NOAA Perspective, in The Continental Shelf: Resources, Boundaries,
and Management 95, 97 (1986). The Department of Commerce recently recommended to reduce
staff by half in NOAA's Office of Ocean and Coastal Resource Management which is responsible
for protecting the nation's coastal zone. 19 Coastal Zone Management I (Aug. 10, 1988).
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of the impacts.' Recently, coastal states finally began receiving a portion
of the revenues, entitled to them under OCSLA, that are generated from
leasing activity on OCS tracts within the transition zone between state
and federal offshore waters.2"
The Protection of Endangered Species and Subsistence Cultures
Litigation over the first OCS lease sale in the Alaskan Arctic has set
the precedent for the influence that statutory requirements to protect endangered species and Native subsistence cultures have on the development
of the Alaskan OCS. Under section 7 of the Endangered Species Act,' 9
the Secretary of Interior undertook consultation with the National Marine
Fisheries Service (NMFS) regarding the potential threat to the endangered
Bowhead whale. The biological opinion prepared by NMFS pursuant to
section 7(b) was only a two page letter that stated there was insufficient
data available from which to determine whether the lease sale was likely
to jeopardize the existence of the Bowead whale.' The United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in North Slope
Borough v. Andrus"°0 reversed the District Court decision that the biological opinion was inadequate.'O° Not only was the brevity of the biological opinion approved, but the appeals court also accepted a statement
of "insufficient information" for certain preliminary actions as a legitimate
biological opinion. 2 Also, the court weakened the prohibition of making
irreversible commitments of resources during the consultation period pur296. Jones 1987, supra note 47, at 595; Fitzgerald, The Seaweed Rebellion: The Battle Over
Section 8(g) Revenues, 8 J. Energy L. & Pol'y 253, 257 & 257 n.2 (1988) [hereinafter Fitzgerald
19881; see Jones 1984, supra note 25, at 267-68. For details on some of the Congressional bills,
see Kitsos, Revenue-SharingLegislation, The Continental Shelf: Resources, Boundaries, and Management 101, 105-07 (1986).
297. Fitzgerald 1988, supra note 296, passim. Section 8(g) of OCSLA established a special set
of procedures for leasing in the three to six mile zone of the OCS so that states could negotiate for
part of the revenues from development in hydrocarbon pools common to the state and federal
government. 43 U.S.C. § 1337(g) (1982). Litigation ensued over how to apportion the 8(g) revenues.
Texas v. Secretary of Interior, 580 F. Supp. 1197 (E.D. Tex. 1984). In part as a result of the court
recommendation to revise the section to simplify future dispute resolution, Congress included in the
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1986 alterations to the disposition of the 8(g) revenues. Pub.
L. No. 99-272, 100 Stat. 148 (1986); Fitzgerald 1988, supra note 296, at 282 & 282 nn. 201-06.
298. 16 U.S.C. § 1536 (1976 & Supp. 111979), amended by Pub. L. No. 96-159, 93 Stat. 1225
(1979), codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-33, 1536-37, 1539, 1542 (1982); see supra notes 186-92 and
accompanying text.
299. Finn, supra note 62, at 374.
300. 642 F.2d 589 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (law suit over the joint federal/state Beaufort Sea lease sale
in 1979) rev'g in part, affig in part, 486 F. Supp. 326 (D.D.C. 1979).
301. Verges and McClendon, supra note 178, at 8; Comment 1981, supra note 12, at 954.
302. Finn, supra note 62, at 374. But, until a final biological opinion based on sufficient information is prepared, the consultation period continues pursuant to section 7(d) during which it is
prohibited to make any irreversible commitment of resources. Verges & McClendon, supra note
178, at 10.

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[Vol. 30

suant to section 7(d) 30 3 by ruling that such a prohibition was only required
under a negative biological opinion." ° The Secretary of Interior can still
proceed even if a negative biological opinion is issued, though his decision
is subject to judicial review, or he can apply for an exemption. 35 The
court's approval of the inadequate performance of NMFS has stripped
the ESA consultation provision of its substantive potential and relegated
it to just another procedural requirement in the OCS administrative process. As a result, the Department of Interior has managed to minimize
the influence of other federal agencies through the ESA on OCS decisions.'
Unique to OCS development in Alaska is the interpretation of the
Secretary of Interior's responsibilities toward protecting Native subsistence cultures. Because Native Alaskans have the same legal status as
Indian wards of the federal government,' ° the federal government has a

unique trust responsibility comparable to that of a guardian.' The federal
trust was first interpreted in the context of OCS development in the same
law suit over the first Beaufort Sea lease sale.' The court ruled that the
Secretary of Interior met his trust obligations as long as he complied with
the environmental statutes. 3 0 This definition is based on the court's view
that a federal trust responsibility arises strictly from specific statutes, but
it has been criticized for being too narrow and only offering indirect
protection. 3 ' It is argued that the proper interpretation of the federal

government's trust responsibility requires that its actions not damage
Native subsistence cultures, which is a stronger legal responsibility than
required by the environmental statutes." 2
303. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(d) (1976 & Supp. 111979) amended by Pub. L. No. 96-159, 93 Stat.
1225 (1979), codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-33, 1536-37, 1539, 1542 (1982).
304. See Verges & McClendon, supra note 178, at 11-17. The court in interpreting section 7(d)
determined that pre-exploration activities, such as geological surveys, were not an unsalvageable
commitment since research data would be useful regardless of whether development occurred.
However, geological surveying activities include seismic tests, sonar tests, and helicopter, airplane,
and vessel traffic, all of which are not environmentally benign. Id. at 15.
305. Finn, supra note 62, at 374 & 374 nn. 105-07. An exemption is considered by the Endangered
Species Committee by the standard that a federal activity cannot jeopardize the continued existence
of an endangered species. See supra notes 175-78.
306. See Finn, supra note 62, at 375-85.
307. Jones 1986, supra note II, at 85 n.196.
308. The federal trust responsibility emanates from the United States historical relationship with
Indian tribes. Though Indian tribes are autonomous nations, they are dependent on the United States
which has sovereign power over the Indian lands. Verges & McClendon, supra note 178, at 19.
The trust responsibility requires that the federal government adhere strictly to legal standards when
dealing with Native Americans. For a detailed discussion of the Supreme Court history in developing
the federal trust, see Jones 1986, supra note II, at 76-85.
309. North Slope Borough v, Andrus, 642 F.2d 589 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (law suit over the joint
federal/state Beaufort Sea lease sale in 1979) rev'g in part, affg in part, 486 F. Supp. 326 (D.D.C.
1979). Verges & McClendon, supra note 178, at 8; Beaufort Sea Contested, supra note 12, at 954.
310. Verges & McClendon, supra note 178, at 18.
311. Id. at 17-18, 30-31; see Jones 1986, supra note 11, at 91-94.
312. Verges & McClendon, supra note 178, at 30; Jones 1986, supra note I1, at 56, 89, 94. Under
this more general scope of the trust responsibility, the Secretary of Interior could not balance the
interests of Native Alaskans with the interest to develop the OCS. As it presently stands, such
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Native Alaskans fear irreparable damage to their subsistence lifestyle
from the impacts of rapid OCS oil and gas development on wildlife and

the environment. As a result, numerous suits seeking to enjoin various
Alaskan OCS lease sales have been brought against the Secretary of
Interior by Alaskan Natives alleging that the Secretary has failed to protect
their subsistence lifestyle by violating his federal trust responsibilities
and statutory duties under ANILCA.3 13 Under Title VIII of ANILCA, 314
section 810,"'5 the federal government is to preserve the opportunity for

Native hunting on federal lands it manages.316 Before approving an ac-

tivity on these federal lands that would severely restrict subsistence use,
the appropriate federal agency must give notice, hold a hearing, and
determine whether the restriction on subsistence use is necessary or take
reasonable steps to reduce the adverse effects." 7 However, the Supreme
Court in a reversal of lower court decisions"' recently ruled that section
810 does not apply to the OCS.31 9 With this ruling, the legal responsibilities of the Secretary of Interior to consider the effects on Native cultures
from offshore oil and gas development in Alaska have been significantly
reduced.
CONCLUSIONS
No statutory mandate for a comprehensive management policy of the
nation's coastal and ocean resources currently exists. Instead, marine
balancing is allowed and would prevent the concerns of a small Native village from prevailing over
ihe interests to explore for oil. Id. at 94. The general trust concept would impose a private trust
standard that federal projects, including OCS lease sales, could not result in the demise of subsistence
cultures. Id. at 95-96; Verges & McClendon, supra note 178, at 28-30. Such a standard could
increase the influence of the need to protect Native cultures in OCS development policy.
313. Amoco Production Company v. Village of Gambell, Alaska, 107 S.Ct. 1396 (1987), rev'g
Village of Gambeil v. Clark, 746 F2d 572 (9th Cir. 1984); Village of False Pass v. Watt, 733 F2d
605 (9th Cir. 1984), aff'g, 565 F.Supp. 1123 (D. Alaska 1983); Inupiat Community of Arctic Slope
v. United States, 746 F.2d 570 (9th Cir. 1984), aft'g, 548 F. Supp. 182 (D. Alaska 1982); North
Slope Borough v. Andrus, 642 F.2d 589 (D.C. Cir. 1980) rev'g in part, afg inpart, 486 F. Supp.
326 (D.D.C. 1979).
314. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1301-3233 (1982).
315. Id. §3120 (1982).
316. Id. § 1311 (1982). Jones 1986, supra note 11, at 96-98.
317. 16 U.S.C. §3120(a) (1982); Amoco v. Village of Gambell, 107 S.Ct. at 1399.
318. Three sets of law suits were pending on the Supreme Court decision in Amoco v. Village
of Gambell: Village of Gambell v. Clark (Gambell 1), 746 F.2d 572 (9th Cir. 1984) (reversed the
District Court decision that ANILCA did not apply to the OCS concerning lease sale #57 in the
Norton Basin); Village of Gambell v. Hodel (Gambell Ii), 774 F.2d 1414 (9th Cir. 1985)(reversed
the District Court denial of preliminary injunctions against exploratory activity in Norton Sound and
in Navarin Basin); and Tribal Village of Akutan v. Hodel, 792 F.2d 1376 (9th Cir. 1986) (upheld
the preliminary injunction on the opening of the bids for OCS lease sale 92 in Bristol Bay); see
Jones 1987, supra note 47, at 588 n.7; Slitor and Weise, supra note 26, at 67-68.
319. Amoco Production Company v. Village of Gambell, Alaska, 107 S.Ct. 1396 (1987). The
decision surrounded the definition of "public lands" in ANILCA. The statute in section 102(3)
defines public lands as those lands "situated in Alaska." 16 U.S.C. § 3102(3) (1982). The Supreme
Court interpreted the geographic detail technically to refer only to the lands owned by Alaska which
would include offshore land within three miles of the coast. Therefore, the OCS is not public land
lying within Alaska. The Ninth Circuit construed the phrase "in Alaska" to mean more generally
the geographic region of Alaska, therefore concluding that ANILCA did apply to the OCS. 107
S.Ct. at 1405.
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resource policy is established indirectly through the numerous statutes
that regulate individual resources or areas in the ocean and coastal zone.
The Reagan administration has made ocean resource management policy
synonymous with the extensive development of the oil and gas resources
of the OCS. Secretary of Interior James Watt and his successors have
also systematically inhibited any significant influence from the outside
on OCS policy and administration, contrary to the statutory requirements
that the public, state governments, and other agencies participate in the
OCS decisionmaking process. The courts in failing to strictly review the
Secretary's decisions have condoned the Secretary of Interior's disregard
for the laws affecting OCS hydrocarbon development.32 With such a
severe erosion of the statutory designs, OCSLAA's multi-step administrative process does not offer much protection against full-scale development once initial funds have been spent. The administrative process
has become essentially a complex set of procedures for the oil industry
to follow, with the guidance of the MMS, in order produce the oil and
gas resources of the OCS.
The Secretary of Interior's efforts to minimize the influence of the state
governments and the public in its decisions on the OCS have met with
considerable litigation. Lawsuits were filed against half of the first ten
lease sales that were held after the approval of Watt's accelerated leasing
program, 2 ' against several OCS Alaskan lease sales,322 and against at
least eight other sales held elsewhere in the nation's OCS.323 Because he
alienated the state governments and the public, James Watt's intent to
expedite OCS development with his accelerated leasing program has
ironically been thwarted by the ensuing litigation. 24 In an effort to address
some of the controversy surrounding the current OCS leasing schedule,
President Bush recently postponed three hotly debated lease sales325 and
appointed an OCS Task Force326 charged with resolving the dispute over
these sales in California and in Florida. Unfortuantely, the purpose of the
task force does not appear to be a substantive reevaluation of current
OCS development policy since no states or environmental organizations
320. Fitzgerald 1987, supra note 206, at 149.
321. Area-wide Program, supra note 167, at 51.
322. See cases, supra notes 276, 300 & 313.
323. History of Poor Consultation Under Section 19 of the OCS Lands Act, memorandum prepared
by Natural Resources Defense Council, 1988 (obtain from the New York office).
324. See House, supra note 204, at 47-49.
325. Bush called for an "indefinite" delay in California lease sales #91 and #95 and for Florida
lease sale #116 in the area south of 26 degrees north latitude in the Gulf of Mexico above the
Florida Keys. On the Coast, OCS Action Alert 2 (May 10, 1989).
326. The National Academy of Sciences will provide technical support to the OCS Task Force
in its recommendations to the President on January 1, 1990. Id. Members of the OCS Task Force
include Secretary of Interior Lujan, Energy Secretary Watkins, Director of the Office of Management

and Budget Richard Darman, NOAA Administrator Evans, former Director of MMS Robert Kallman,
and EPA Administrator Reilly. Id.
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are on the task force, and several other biologically sensitive and controversial OCS leasing areas are not going to be addressed."'
With little influence over the Department of Interior's decisions and
with little retribution through the courts, the states and environmental
organizations have been forced to rely on annual stop-gap measures to

prohibit development in biologically sensitive areas of the OCS. Since
1982, Congress has imposed leasing moratoria to protect various areas
of the OCS by attaching provisions to the Department of Interior's annual
appropriations legislation that prohibit the expenditure of funds for leasing

activities in these areas.328 Though the acreage under moratoria has increased from 736,000 acres in 1982 to over 52 million acres,329 no moratoria have applied to the Alaskan OCS.' 33 However, both Appropriation
Committees of Congress have recently passed extensive leasing moratoria
"'
for the coming year, including a ban on drilling in Bristol Bay, Alaska,33
even though the new Secretary of Interior Manuel Lujan has publicly
criticized the measure.332 It is a sign of poor public policy that such
temporary and reactive measures like Congressional moratoria must be
327. Even the EPA Administrator was included on the task force only after the insistence of
members of Congress. Netv Administration, Same Old Story, Greenpeace 20 (May/June 1989).
328. For the history on leasing moratoria see Note 1986, supra note 287, at 713 n. 193. OCS
areas off of California were placed under moratorium in 1982. Id. Through the 1989 fiscal year,
moratoria were placed on OCS tracts off northern California, in the Georges Bank, and north of the
Florida Keys. Moratorium Victory, OCS Action Alert I (Aug. 20, 1988); Fact Sheet: Proposed Fiscal
Year 1989 OCS Leasing Deferrals, prepared by the Natural Resources Defense Council, June 8,
1988 (obtain from the New York office). Hodel's five-year leasing schedule offers portions of three
of these areas under moratoria. See supra note 245.
329. Area-wide Program, supra note 167, at 53.
330. An attempt a few years ago to place Bristol Bay under moratorium failed to pass the House
Subcommittee on Interior Appropriations by one vote. OCS Action Alert 2 (Oct. 28, 1988).
331. Shabecoff, House Panel Urges One-year Ban on Oil Drilling Off Much of U.S., N.Y. Times,
June 30, 1989 at 1, col. 2. The approved OCS leasing moratoria that would go into effect October
I, prohibit any expenditures by the Department of Interior on leasing activities off the entire coast
of California, in Georges Bank, and in a 50 mile wide stretch of the mid-Atlantic coastal area, and
prohibits expenditures to issue permits for drilling activities in leased areas off the Florida Keys,
and for the first time in Alaska's Bristol Bay. Id. The Senate Appropriation Committee moratoria
covers much of the same territory, but it allows spending on pre-leasing activities. Shabecoff, Senate
Panel Votes to Limit Oil Tankers, N.Y. Times, July 26, 1989, at A12, col. 1; Roger, Senate Panel
Backs an Oil-Drilling Ban for Alaska Bay, Proposes Lobbying Rules, Wall St. J., July 25, 1989,
at A 11, col. 1.
332. Secretary Lujan criticized the House moratoria bill for hindering domestic oil development
and because the complete ban on leasing activity would include a ban on any research or environmental
studies on the affected OCS areas. Lujan Criticizes Congress for Oil Plan, N.Y. Times, July 19,
1989, at AI0, col. 2. Though Secretary Lujan supports the Senate's provisions which do not ban
all leasing activities, environmental organizations claim that this enables the Department of Interior
to perform many of the pre-leasing steps and be prepared to hold lease sales as soon as leasing
moratoria are lifted instead of delaying the entire pre-leasing process. Shabecoff, House Panel Urges
One-year Ban on Oil Drilling Off Much of U.S., N.Y. Times, June 30, 1989 at 1, col. 2. For a
discussion of the OCS areas and reasons supporting leasing and/or drilling moratoria, see L. Speer,
Testimony of the Natural Resources Defense Council, et. al. before the Subcommittee on Interior
and Related Agencies, Committee on Appropriations, U.S. House of Representatives, on the Department of Interior's Offshore Oil and Gas Leasing Program (February 9, 1989).
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employed to protect valuable resources of the OCS. Yet, a one year
moratorium offers more protection from development than the alternative
of court imposed injunctions on development activities.333
RECOMMENDATIONS
Some fundamental changes are needed in order to establish an environmentally sound policy for OCS oil and gas development. Foremost,
the development of the OCS hydrocarbon resources must be placed within
the perspective of a national energy policy stressing energy efficiency.
Under the Reagan administration, the national energy policy has been
focused on increasing domestic oil production and there has been no
indication so far that the Bush administration has changed this policy. 3"
Watt considered the OCS as the primary source of this new domestic
source of oil. Though the OCS hydrocarbon resources are an important
energy resource, the OCS is not the "miracle solution" that Watt purported
and upon which the Reagan administration based its energy policy.335
Estimates place the total amount of oil resources that are economically
recoverable for the entire nation at over 100 billion barrels even with the
removal of oil resources that occur in environmentally sensitive areas
both on land and offshore.336 However, both the OCS and state offshore
lands are estimated to contain only 18.2 billion barrels,337 while the bulk
333. Efforts to prevent development in Alaska's Bristol Bay have been forced to rely on the
protection offered from court ordered injunctions. The Ninth Circuit recently reversed its injunction
on the opening of the bids from the lease sale after the Supreme Court ruled on ANILCA considerations
in Amoco Production Company v. Village of Gambell, Alaska and remanded the case to the district
court to decide on the remaining issues over alleged violations of the ESA and NEPA. 107 S.Ct.
1396 (1987); Tribal Village of Akutan v. Hodel, 859 F.2d 651 (9th Cir.), modified 869 F2d 1185
(9th Cir. 1988); OCS Action Alert 2 (R. Charter ed. Oct. 28, 1988). The district court ruled in favor
of the Secretary of Interior on issues concerning OCSLAA, the ESA, and NEPA. but granted a stay
on the injunction pending appeal. Tribal Village of Akutan v. Hodel, Civ. No. A85-701 (D, Alaska
1988); Briefs for appellants at 7-8, Tribal Village of Akutan v. Hodel, (9th Cir. 1988) (Nos. 883610, 88-3703, 88-3729). Prior to the court decision the Senate attempted to over-ride the court's
injunction which would have set a bad precedent. Opening the bids would prejudice the case because
the Department of Interior could argue that millions of dollars in revenues would be foregone if the
sale was vacated. Moratorium 88, OCS Action Alert 2 (July 18, 1988). The bids totaled $95.4
million and were opened soon after the Ninth Circuit ruling. The appeal to Vice-President Bush by
the Alaskan Congressional delegation to keep the bids sealed went unanswered. OCS Action Alert,
3 (Oct. 28, 1988).
334. Lujan Criticizes Congress for Oil Plan, N.Y. Times, July 19, 1989, at AI0, col. 2.
335. See House, supra note 204, at 63-65.
336. Stege & Beyea, Oil and Gas Resources on Special Federal Lands: Wilderness and Wildlife
Refuges, II Ann. Rev. Energy 143, 154, 159-60 (1986). The total estimated oil and gas resources
for the United States is over I I I billion barrels of oil and 820 trillion cubic feet of natural gas. Of
the oil resources, 6,6 percent occur in environmentally sensitive areas such as designated wilderness
areas. Of the 20.5 billion barrels of oil estimated to occur in the OCS and state offshore lands, II
percent was predicted to be excluded from development because these oil resources lie in biologically
sensitive areas such as Bristol Bay, Georges Bank, areas off the California coast, and elsewhere.
337. id. at 160. The figure of 18.2 billion barrels includes both the federal OCS and state offshore
oil resources whereas the estimate of 12.2 billion barrels cited in the opening paragraph are only
for OCS resources. Id. at 154; see supra note 4.
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of the oil resources lie under nonfederal land in small to medium-size
fields.338 There are also other sources of oil, or equivalent amounts of
energy to that in oil, which are readily available and more environmentally
benign than producing oil from the OCS. 339 For example, increasing the
miles per gallon standards for automobiles and light trucks within current
technically feasible limitations could produce oil savings equal to the
amount of oil resources estimated to occur in the entire OCS.' With a
variety of sources of oil to meet the nation's petroleum demand, there is
little justification for expanding OCS development into frontier areas like
the Alaskan Arctic where current technology is severely limited and basic
scientific information is still unknown.
Extensive Congressional evaluations and criticisms by the state governments and interest groups have resulted in recommendations to legislate many changes to the current OCS oil and gas development program.
A primary consideration is to reduce the Secretary of Interior's discretionary powers under OCSLAA which enabled Watt and Hodel to elevate
oil development over environmental concerns contrary to the statute's
intent.34' One means of restricting the scope of the Secretary's powers is
to increase the strength of the courts' standard of review of the agency's
actions by requiring a "substantive evidence" standard instead of the
weak "arbitrary and capricious" standard which is now in use."' 2 A stronger
standard of review would enable the courts to evaluate the substantive
338. Fisher, Can the U.S. Oil and Gas Resource Base Support Sustained Production?, 236 Science
1631, 1632, 1635 (1987). Since 1975, nearly 97 percent of the oil fields discovered have contained
less than 10 million barrels of oil
and gas equivalent. The number of these small oil fields remaining
is quite large. Also, a large volume of recoverable oil exists in currently known reservoirs. Even if
only half of the estimated volume of oil is extracted from new fields or from secondary development
in existing reservoirs, such volumes would be able to sustain the production level from 1979 through
1985 for 20 to 25 years.
339. R. Watson, Oil and Conservation Resources Fact Sheet: A Least-cost Planning Perspective,
passim (August 1988) (obtain from the Natural Resources Defense Council San Francisco office).
Readily available sources of energy and oil include: increasing the miles per gallon (MPG) standard
for automobiles, retrofitting homes, improving the energy efficiency of household appliances, and
increasing the use of mass transit. The potential amount of energy conserved from just these five
measures totals 40 billion barrels of oil equivalent as compared to the risked mean estimate of 18
billion barrels of oil predicted to occur in the OCS and in the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge. Id.
at 22. For a discussion of the strategies available to respond to another OPEC oil crisis and improve
national security regarding our reliance on imported oil without having to sacrifice biologically
significant areas that possess potential oil resources, see Statement of Peter A. A. Berle, President
of National Audubon Society, before the House Interior Subcommittee on Water and Power Resources
Hearing on Issues Concerning Proposals for Oil and Gas Development Activities Within the Arctic
National Wildlife Refuge, Alaska, July 21, 1987, at 6-13. See also Chasis & Speer, How to Avoid
Another Valdez, N.Y. Times, May 20, 1989, at 27, col. 1.
340. Watson, supra note 339, at 12. By the year 2020, the cumulative savings is predicted to be
22.8 billion barrels of oil if the MPG standards are set at 45 for cars and 30 for light trucks in 1998
which are both then raised to 60 MPG and 45 MPG, respectively, by 2008.
341. Chasis, Environmental Perspectives on OCS Leasing Policy, in The Continental Shelf: Resources, Boundaries, and Management 205, 205 (1986); House, supra note 204, at 67-68.
342. Such legislation was introduced in Congress in 1983, but it did not pass. Miller, supra note
117, at 437 n. 239.
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nature of the Secretary's decisions instead of deferring to the Secretary
over technical questions or simply ensuring that the Secretary has met
all procedural obligations.4 3 Equally important to redirecting the management of OCS oil and gas development so that it follows the intents
of OCSLAA is for Congress to mandate a return to some version of the
original tract selection process and abandon Watt's area-wide leasing
program.'
To establish the integrated decisionmaking process that OCSLAA and
other statutes were intended to create, and to recognize the importance
of the states in OCS development, legislation is necessary to create a
revenue-sharing program," 5 increase the power of the state governor's
comments under section 19 of OCSLAA, 346 require state "consistency"
reviews under the CZMA of OCS lease sales, 7 and require public proceedings of the ESA and FWCA consultations to improve interagency
coordination. 4 To ensure that OCS decisions properly incorporate the
protection of endangered species and Native subsistence culture, it is
important to develop specific guidelines for preparing biological opinions
and FWCA comments, 9 legislate that Title VIII of ANILCA applies to
the OCS, 3" and adopt the much stronger private trust standard for reviewing whether the federal government in OCS development has met
its trust obligations to protect the rights of Native Alaskans.35' Yet, even
if all of these recommendations are instituted, a cooperative environment
of integrated decisionmaking in the administration of OCS oil and gas
development is still dependent on the support of the Secretary of Interior.
Not only are the hydrocarbon resources of the OCS just one of many
energy sources, but also just one of the numerous ocean and coastal
resources. Though there is no comprehensive marine resource management statute, it is important to move in this direction in order to properly
balance the development and conservation of the numerous marine resources. To give equal weight to environmental considerations at the
policy level, mitigation of ecological damage cannot continue to be the
343. See supra notes 215, 233, 279 and accompanying text.
344. House, supra note 204, at 68; see supra notes 223-27 and accompanying text.
345. See supra notes 295-96 and accompanying text; Jones 1984, supra note 25, at 267-68.
346. Chasis. supra note 341, at 205. Along with the proposed legislation to change the court
standard of review was a provision requiring the Secretary to accept a state's recommendations under
section 19 unless they do not reasonably balance state and federal interests. Miller, supra note 117,
437 n. 239.
347. See supra notes 152-62 and accompanying text.
348. The problems with interagency coordination over OCS evelopment and suggested improvements are discussed in Finn, supra note 62, 375-86.

349. Id.at 384.
350. See supra notes 313-319 and accompanying text.
351. Jones 1986, supra note 11, at 56, 95; Verges & McClendon, supra note 178, at 28-30. For
a discussion of the federal trust responsibility, see supra notes 307-12 and accompanying text.
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primary means of dealing with the biological resources of the ocean.352
Unfortunately, there is no mechanism that requires the Secretary of Interior to remove areas of the OCS permanently from oil and gas development for environmental reasons even though other natural resource
management policies have such provisions.353 Recognizing this glaring
problem in the face of the Department of Interior's plans to offer much
of Alaska's OCS for leasing and potential development," 4 former Governor Hammond of the state of Alaska had to recommend his own set of
criteria for leasing in the Alaskan OCS that were intended to balance the
need to protect Alaska's valuable biological resources and development
of the OCS.' 5
One means of instituting a more balanced policy of OCS development
and environmental protection would be to manage the development through
a comprehensive plan wherein categories of protection are assigned
throughout the OCS.356 The most restrictive category would prohibit all
aspects of oil and gas development while in other areas OCS activities
would be subject to varying degrees of mitigation measures.357 Such a
system would reduce litigation and help the oil industry better anticipate
constraints to development. Category designations and mitigation measures could be modified periodically as technological advances are made
and as biological understanding becomes more complete.
On March 24, 1989, the largest tanker oil spill in United States history
occurred when the supertanker Exxon Valdez ran aground in Prince William Sound and spilled an estimated 11 million gallons of North Slope
crude oil."' The spilled oil contaminated over 700 miles of pristine shore352. See supra text accompanying notes 251-78.
353. Chasis, supra note 341, at 205. For example, the Forest Service and Bureau of Land
Management are required to set aside areas for protection in their multi-year planning programs.
354. See supra notes 216-29 and accompanying text.
355. Hammond suggested that the first OCS areas to be leased should be adjacent to areas already
under production, possess low natural hazards to reduce the risk of oil spills, have low biological
productivity and commercial or subsistence values, and should be in areas where the technology
exists to clean up or divert a major oil spill from environmentally sensitive areas. Hammond also
categorized large regions of the Alaskan OCS into three groups: areas where leasing would be allowed
because both the infrastructure and proven technology exists, such as the nearshore area of the
Beaufort Sea around Prudhoe Bay; regions where leasing could occur in the next five years based
on his criteria; and regions where leasing should be postponed until more ecological baseline data
are available, such as in the Chukchi Sea. Jones 1986, supra note I1, at 64-65.
356. Assigning levels of environmental protection has been utilized elsewhere in natural resource
management. See Bolze & Lee 1989 , supra note 10, at 247 n. 130.
357. For a discussion of this plan which was proposed for the Alaskan OCS, see Bolze & Lee
1989, supra note 10, at 243-48.
358. Shabecoff, Largest U.S. Tanker Spill Spews 270,000 barrels of Oil OffAlaska, N.Y. Times,
March 25, 1989, at 1, col. 1. Though the vastness of the spill was shocking, such a spill had been
predicted by the Department of Interior in its EIS on the TransAlaska pipeline. Valdez: The Predicted
Oil Spill, 244 Science 20, 21 (1989); see infra note 364.
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line in the Sound and in the Gulf of Alaska,359 and has reportedly killed
at least 27,000 birds and 800 sea otters, though the actual wildlife death
toll is estimated to be ten times these figures, "6 Scientific experts conservatively predict that recovery of the ecosystem will take ten years
because the sheltered coves and cold temperatures will slow the natural
degradation processes that remove the oil.361 This catastrophic accident
and the string of other publicized tanker spills that occurred shortly
afterwards 2 have graphically demonstrated that many changes are needed
in oil industry practices, especially in the transportation sector.363 The
Exxon Valdez spill revealed "serious shortcomings in tanker standards, 3"
359. "'Treated and Demobilized," But Far from Clean, Anchorage Daily News, July 9, 1989, at
A I col. I and A6-A7. Figures on oiled shoreline are as of May 10, 1989, when the Alaska Department
of Environmental Conservation completed its latest survey. Id. Coastlines of two national parks,
Kenai Fjords and Katmai, and of four national wildlife refuges, Alaska Maritime, Becharof, Kodiak,
and Alaska Peninsula, were contaminated by the spill. Cline, Why the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge
Should Not Be Developed, Alaska Pub. Aff. J. 34, 36 (University of Alaska Southeast second quarter
1989).
360. "Treated and Demobilized," But Far from Clean, supra note 359.
361. Long, Slow Recovery Predicted for Alaska, 244 Science 22, passim (1989).
362. Three tanker accidents occurred in one weekend: the World Prodigy spilled 420,000 gallons
of refined oil into Narragansett Bay, the Presidente Rivera spilled 800,000 gallons of heavy oil into
the Delaware River near Claymont, Delaware, and a freighter ran into an oil barge in the Houston
shipping channel spilling 250,000 gallons of crude oil. Two Waterways Fouled by Spills from Oil
Tankers, N.Y. Times, June 25, 1989, at 1, col. 1; Oil Spills Leave Trail of Disturbing Questions,
N.Y. Times, June 27, 1989, at I, col. 2. These tanker spills are only three of thousands that occur
every year in United States waters. There were 5000 to 6000 spills in 1988 involving oil and other
toxic substances in American navigable waters according to the Coast Guard. Shabecoff, The Rash
of Tanker Spills is Part of a Pattern of Thousands a Year, N.Y. Times, June 29, 1989, at A20, col.
I. Twelve of these were over 100,000 gallons, ten were between 10,000 to 100,000 gallons, and
the rest were smaller that 10,000 gallons. Id. This figure is about half the number of spills recorded
a decade ago. Id. On a global scale, the National Research Council estimates an average of 3.2
million metric tons a year of oil enter the marine environment, nearly half of which is from tanker,
vessel, and barge transportation. National Research Council, National Academy of Sciences, Oil in
the Sea: Inputs, Fates, and Effects 82 (1985) (published in Washington, DC). Though large spills
are highly visible, it is the numerous small spills that contribute much of the oil into the marine
environment. Bolze & Lee, supra note 47, at 1922.
363. The transportation sector not only involves tanker and barge shipment of oil and gas but the
port storage facilities. Large and ecologically destructive oil spills also occur from accidents at these
facilities. A recent example occurred in January 1988 when 700,000 gallons of toxic diesel fuel
spilled into the Monongahela River at Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania after an Ashland Oil storage tank
collapsed from structural failure. Saxon, Monongahela Oil Spill Threatens Water Supplies in Pinsburgh Area, N.Y. Times, Jan. 5, 1988, at 1, col. 3. More recently an oil-storage tank located on
the Arthur Kill in New Jersey near the Hudson River ruptured and spilled 1.26 million gallons into
the containment area around the tank. Spill Contained After Jersey Oil Tank Bursts, NY. Times,
July 19, 1989, at B I, col. 2. Only 200 gallons spilled into the waterway and.were contained by
booms. Id.
364. Of the many possible design improvements for oil tankers of all sizes, the primary recommendation has been to require double hulls which are already required for chemical carriers and
liquified natural gas tankers. Lohr, Tanker in Big Spill Typifies Freewheeling Industry, N.Y. Times,
July 3, 1989, at 1, col. 2. Congress actually required that tankers used to transport Prudhoe Bay
crude from the TransAlaska pipeline have double hulls when it authorized the pipeline in 1973.
Fradkin, The Valdez Connection, Audubon at 134, 137 (March 1977). This decision was based on
the findings by the Department of Interior in its EIS on the pipeline that the greatest risk from the
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tanker traffic management,36 competency of tanker crews, waste disposal
practices, oil spill contingency plans a66 and enforcement367 of environmental regulations. '' It is also apparent that current oil spill clean-up
techniques have been virtually ineffective in the subarctic conditions of

Prince William Sound. 69 Above all, the oil industry's claim that it operates
safely and abides by environmental regulations has lost credibility, whether

developing oil resources on the OCS or onshore, or transporting domestic
or imported oil.370
The Exxon Valdez oil spill has been a sobering lesson to the nation that
there is an important need to reevaluate national energy and marine resource policies. With a cautious and environmentally sound approach to
OCS oil and gas development, there is no need to jeopardize the future
of the other resources and unique values of the Alaskan Arctic. However,

with the oil industry already heavily invested in the Arctic, if the OCS
development program continues in its current state and oil industry practices are not improved, we will almost assuredly and needlessly sacrifice
the Alaskan Arctic.
transportation system was the tanker segment, because a tanker "on its way out of Valdez might
break up in this remote area where little could be done to intervene, permanently changing 'the
solitude and wilderness aspects of this scenic area.'" Valdez: The Predicted Oil Spill, 244 Science
20, 21 (1989). However, the Coast Guard never passed the double hull regulations for oil tankers.
Id.
365. After fifteen years, the Coast Guard has begun a review of its traffic-control system in the
aftermath of the Alaskan spill. Because of budget cuts over the years several port facilities have
been closed and radar control systems scaled back, such as the case in Prince William Sound.
Cushman, Coast Guard Studies Need for Improved Ship Traffic Control, N.Y. Times, June 26, 1989,

at A17, col. 3.
366. Exxon and the Alyeska Pipeline Consortium have been highly criticized for their poor and
sluggish response to the spill and in ultimately being unable to contain the spill within the surroundings
of the accident. Egan, Exxon Conceded it Can't Contain Most of Oil Spill, N.Y. Times, March 30,

1989, at 1, col. 1; Begley, Drew, and Hager, Smothering the Waters, Newsweek, April 10, 1989,
at 54; Wells & McCoy, Oil of Control: How Unpreparedness Turned the Alaska Spill into Ecological

Debacle, Wall St. J., April 3, 1989, at 1, col. I.
367. One of the most important outcomes of Exxon Valdez oil spill has been the exposure of
Alyeska's poor environmental record. According to one report, Alyeska was negligent in abiding
by environmental regulations, fabricated testing data, and refused outright to allow inspections of
its pipeline and port facilities. McCoy, Alyeska Record Shows How Big Oil Neglected Alaska En-

vironment, Wall St. J., July 6, 1989, at 1, col. 6; see also supra note 49 and accompanying text.
368. Cline, supra note 359, at 36.
369. Though Exxon has treated approximately 100 to 200 miles of the oiled coastline, much of
it has become re-oiled from subsurface oil seeping up through the rocky substrate, and from oil
slicks hitting the area after treatment. Wald, Exxon Estimating $1.28 Billion Costfor Spill Cleanup,
N.Y. Times, July 25, 1989, at 1, col. 3; Sullivan, Exxon's Cleanup of Oil Spill Is Falling Behind
Schedule, Alaska Officials Say, Wall St. J., July 20, 1989, at A4, col. 6. The high wind conditions
that occurred a few days after the accident are common in this region and severely limited any
activity on the spill for several days. Egan, High Winds Hamper Oil Spill Cleanup offAlaska, N.Y.
Times, March 28, 1989, at 1, col. 1. For details on the sensitivity of subarctic Alaskan habitats to
oiling, and on the quality of current clean-up technology, see infra notes 18, 59-60 and accompanying
text.
370. Wells, Credibility Gap: Oil Industry's Inability to Contain Spills at Sea Poses Political

Trouble, Wall St. J., June 26, 1989, at 1, col. 6.
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ADDENDUM

Since the writing of this article, Congress has passed the most extensive
leasing moratoria legislation to date for fiscal year 1990 which includes
a ban on drilling in Bristol Bay, Alaska. In addition, to prepare its rec-

ommendations to the President, the OCS Task Force commissioned the
National Research Council (NRC) of the National Academy of Sciences
to evaluate the scientific and economic data that the Department of Interior
uses to make lease sale decisions in the disputed California and Florida

lease areas. The ensuing NRC report, released in early November 1989,
was highly critical of the quality of the available data, and the report all

but condemned the entire OCS leasing program.37 1 Based on the NRC
study, which is part of two ongoing evaluations of aspects of the OCS
program, the OCS Task Force in early January 1990 recommended to
President Bush that the disputed lease sales be deferred or cancelled for
one to three years.372 A significant outcome of the NRC report has been
that it has helped to spark congressional interest 73 in addressing one of

the nation's more misguided energy development programs.

371. Nat. Res. Counc., Nat'l Acad. of Sci., The Adequacy of Environmental Information for
Outer Continental Shelf Oil and Gas Decisions: Florida and California I-8 (1989).
372. Shabecoff, President Is Urged to Delay Plans for Offshore Drilling, N.Y. Times, Jan. I,
1990 at Ai6, col. 1.
373. One bill that has been introduced is entitled the Ocean Protection Act of 1990. The bill
prohibits drilling in the OCS in a 100-mile-wide swath along the nation's coastline, excluding Texas,
Louisiana, Alabama, and Mississippi. Off certain states the prohibition zone is narrower or wider
than 100 miles. The bill also bans drilling within Georges Bank off Massachusetts, calls for cancellation of leases and permits already in effect in southwestern Florida and in Bristol Bay, Alaska,
and calls for a study of cancelling lease sales off North Carolina. H.R. 3751, 101st Cong., I st Sess.
(1990); also see Bolze, Reforming Federal PolicySeen as Key to Slowing Offshore Oil Rush, Audubon
Activist Mar.-Apr. 1990, at 10.

